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I. INTRODUCTION
Woody Guthrie's anthem heralds that "[tihis land is your land, this land is
my land .... This land was made for you and me."1  Most people agree when
they contemplate a sunset over a cloud-veiled mountain or vast sweep of sage-
scented range. Their affirmation is strongest when the lands observed are feder-
ally owned. Nevertheless, when others view the same landscapes they emphasize
the "my" of the refrain. These observers see "their" mining claim or "their"
grazing allotment. The mantra of "private property" is superimposed on the
lands. Controversies about prospective uses of the so-called "public lands"2 ex-
emplify the discordance between "ours" and "yours." Some style this contest as a
conflict between private rights and public rights.
. Associate Professor of Law. Associate Director, National Energy Law & Policy Institute,
University of Tulsa, College of Law.
1. WOODY GUTHRIE, This Land is My Land (Ludlow Music 1956).
2 . Currently, the term "public lands" is statutorily applied to Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1988). This article, however, will consider not only these "public
lands," but also those lands federally owned and accessible to the public, namely national parks,
national forests, and national wildlife refuges. See generally Maria E. Mansfield, A Primer of Public Land
Law, 68 WASH. L REV. 801 (1993).
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Labeling these spheres "public" and "private," however, can result in a mis-
leading dichotomy. For example, there may be no "public" divorced from indi-
vidual concerns. A more correct dichotomy, therefore, would be collective or
non-consumptive interests versus exclusionary or developmental desires. Regard-
less of labels, a conflict between different goals for the lands does exist. Recog-
nizing that non-use is also a use, what weight or dignity do the rights of propo-
nents of each proposed use of the public lands deserve? An examination of the
definition of property delineates the core nature of both types of rights.
Property serves two masters: the individual and society. Even considering
only the individualistic sphere, which emphasizes that property is an
"expectation" of drawing an "advantage" from the object in question, 3 both
"public" and "private" players have "property" interests. The mining claimant
and the grazing permittee have what most agree at least would approximate tradi-
tional property interests, 4 but looked at through the expectation lens, the bird
watcher, the wilderness advocate, and the downstream water user also have prop-
erty interests in the individualistic sense. In addition to individual expectations
and advantages, the public lands offer social or communal benefits, which em-
phasize the second property penumbra, the enhancement of society. After de-
lineating the dignity of rights to collective benefits, the essay then turns to the
question of how to resolve conflicts between more traditional private property
rights and these collective rights. These conflicts generally emerge when new
development is proposed or old uses are recognized as harmful to the ecosystem.
The public land managing agency must then determine what regulatory activity
is appropriate, with the possibility of quelling the private activity as an option.
This essay posits that balancing with a sliding scale is required to determine
which "right" should be forwarded on any particular lands. Neither the devel-
opmental nor the non-consumptive interest may prevail automatically absent
legislation so demanding.5 If development is precluded, a taking that requires
compensation may result or it may not. First, even if there is a total diminution
of value, the "nuisance" exception to compensation for the denial of economic
use of property still persists after Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.6 This
exception, however, requires a strong look at the benefits from development, and
does not concentrate solely on the perceived affronts to the environment or pub-
lic health. Nuisance is an unreasonable use of property that unreasonably impacts
the property of another. The value of the private use must be considered. Addi-
tionally, in two footnotes to Lucas, Justice Scalia acknowledges the continuing
3 . See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112-13 (4th ed. 1882).
4 . Both are peculiar species of "property." See infra notes 235-37, 275-76 and accompanying
text.
5 . The Endangered Species Act, for example, protects endangered species by a rule of inal-
ienability. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See general Guido Calabresi & A. Doug-
las Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rule; and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
6 . 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
[Vol. 65
1994] WHEN "PUBLIC" RIGHTS MEET "PRIVATE" RIGHTS 195
importance to takings jurisprudence of analyzing expectations7 and property
boundaries. The latter inquiry includes defining both the extent of tracts and
legal rights that a regulation may have impacted. 8  Expectations and property
delineation may be more important in determining whether a taking has oc-
curred in the public lands context than determining whether a regulation mimics
nuisance law and therefore does not require compensation.
Lucas, therefore, did not preclude agency flexibility in public land use regu-
lation. To explicate this conclusion, Part I briefly reviews the history of public
land law, with a concentration on the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM").
Part II then examines the meaning of "public" rights. It identifies both indi-
vidually-oriented and collective interests, both of which are among the "public"
values the public lands serve. In Part III, the dual nature of property is exam-
ined, with the argument that the "expectation" strand normally associated with
individualistic analysis may also apply to some of the "public rights." The im-
pact of classifying previously labeled "public rights" as property rights is consid-
ered. Part IV examines how the land managing agency itself should consider the
conflict in rights. Next, the question of takings is considered in Part V. This
part concentrates on the Lucas case, putting it both in historic perspective and
examining not only the nuisance exception, but also ways to determine whether
"total" diminution of property has resulted. Part VI anticipates how this takings
law could be applied to decisions impacting the public lands, using a grazing
permit and an unpatented mining claim as paradigms. Paradoxically, the grazing
permittee-who by statute has no "right, title, interest or estate in or to the
lands"9 -may have a greater equitable claim to compensation under expectation
analysis than the owner of the mining claim.
II. AN ENCAPSULATED HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
The public lands in the United States have a distinct historical and legal
status, making them neither truly common property nor property owned by no
one. Originally, the label "public domain" applied to all federally-owned lands
which were acquired by treaty from other nations, including Native Americans,
or lands ceded to the federal government by the thirteen original states.10 The
special legal status of the lands arises because the Constitution places in Con-
gress the "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
7. l at 2894 n.7.
8 . Id at 2895 n.8.
9. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1988).
10 . Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901). The public domain contrasts with acquired lands,
which had been owned by private parties or the states prior to federal acquisition. Disposition sys-
tems may differ for acquired lands. See, eg., Acquired Lands Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-359 (1988).
For management under the Federal Land and Policy Management Act ("FLPMA7), the distinction is
abolished. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e)(1988).
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specting the' Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."11 The
Supreme Court has confirmed that this power is plenary, and includes the power
of a sovereign as well as a proprietor.12 No overriding "trust" responsibility to a
particular vision of the public good fetters congressional authority over these
lands.
13
There is no requirement to retain the lands in public ownership unless Con-
gress so chooses. In fact, the initial attitude toward these lands was just the op-
posite: a secondary meaning of the term public domain was that it encompassed
lands open to entry and settlement.14 As the Supreme Court put it, traditional
public land laws were statutes "governing the alienation of public land."'
15
Therefoie, "private" rights to these lands were inevitable and, initially, public
land law provided the method through which minerals and lands were placed in
private hands. Any current agenda about the management and direction of pub-
lic land policy must acknowledge the legacy of this history.
A vivid example of the historical focus of public land law is the first statute
assigning duties to the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary was:
[t]o perform all executive duties appertaining to the surveying and sale of
the public lands of the United States, or in anywise respecting such public
lands, and, also, such as relate to private claims of land, and the issuing of
patents for all grants of land under the authority of the Government.
16
The statute emphasized land disposition. Early cases explicated the lands' status.
No one could wrongfully exclude others from the public lands, 17 but they were
11 . U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Enclave Clause of Article I provides another source of
authority over public lands. It states that Congress may:
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over [the District of Columbia]
and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legis-
lature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful Buildings.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. See generally Mansfield, supra note 2, at 803.
12 . 'Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
13. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911):
[lit is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for
Congress to determine .... [Rights to establish and disestablish reserves] are rights
incident to proprietorship, to say nothing of the power of the United States as a sov-
ereigfi over the property belonging to it.
Cf. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (public trust doctrine may restrain ability to
alienate navigable waters and submerged lands forming harbors); see also Marla E. Mansfield, On the
Cusp of Property Rights. Lessons from Public Land Law, 18 EcOL L.Q. 43, 84-88 (1991) (public trust doc-
trine does not create a separate substantive duty for Congress with regard to public lands but provides
an interpretive guide to courts when Congress is less than clear).
14 . Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875).
15 .1 Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 19 (1965). By 1934, the disposition of land, as opposed to
resources such as minerals, was slowed. See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 822.
16. 43 U.S.C. § 2 (1988); see also American Colloid Co. v. Hodel, 701 F. Supp. 1537, 1542-43
(D. Wyo. 1988) (requiring BLM to make initial decisions on mineral patent applications).
17.1 Se4 e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320
(1890); United States ex mrl Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1988), af'g, 620 F. Supp. 1414
(D. Wyo. 1985); United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980).
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to be exploited. 18 The Secretary had a duty to verify that public land laws were
complied with, and that invalid claims were not asserted against these commonly-
held lands.
19
Obviously, when lands are open to disposition laws, individuals and states
can deprive the federal government of the lands and resources by complying with
these laws. Therefore, from time to time either Congress or the executive would
"reserve" lands for special purposes or "withdraw" lands from the operation of
the disposition laws.20  Many of the modern public land management sys-
tems-the national forests,2 1 wildlife refuges,22 and the national monuments23 -
originated in such executive action either before or in conjunction with similar
congressional action.24 These reservations acknowledged that some lands should
not be disposed of under the general laws. The reservations did not, however,
necessarily mean that private rights to resources were being ignored.
From the time, close to the National Forest Service's inception, that Gifford
Pinchot took the reins of the Forest Service, the forests were laboratories to im-
plement conservation theory, which embraced wise use of resources in both pres-
ent and future generations.25 Moreover, according to the Supreme Court, the
purposes of the national forests were watershed protection and timber produc-
18. See, eg., Buford, 133 U.S. at 326:
[Tihere is an implied license, growing out of the custom of nearly a hundred years,
that the public lands of the United States, especially those in which the native grasses
are adapted to the growth and fattening of domestic animals, shall be free to the
people who seek to use them where they are left open and unenclosed, and no act of
government forbids this use ...
This provision not only recognizes grants of rights by "custom," but also equates public land
with exploitation.
19 . See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); Cameron v. United States,
252 U.S. 450, 460 (1920); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 177-82 (1891).
20. See generally Mansfield, supra note 2, at 822; GEORGE C. COGGINS, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW ch. 9 (1990); David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Execu-
tive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURcES J. 279 (1982); Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., Withdrawals Under
the Federal Land Poligy and Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 311 (1979).
21 . National forests were initially set aside under executive authority pursuant to the Forest
Reserve Amendment of 1891, which stated that the President could reserve "any part of the public
lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not."
16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed 1976). Congress partially repealed this authority in the Act of Mar. 4, 1907,
ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1271 (repealing authority in most of the western states). Before the repeal, however,
most of the lands currently in the national forests were reserved. See generally James L. Huffman, A
History of Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENVTL L. 239 (1978).
22 . For example, in 1903, President Roosevelt declared Pelican Island a Federal Bird Reserva-
tion. COGGINS, supra note 20, at § 2.03[21[c].
23 . National monuments, part of the national park system, could initially be reserved by the
executive under the Antiquities Act of 1906. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1988). National parks, however,
were each reserved by specific congressional authorization. 16 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See, eg., the Yellow-
stone Park Act of 1872, 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1988). Some national monuments, such as the Jackson Hole
National Monument and Grand Canyon National Monument, later became national parks.
24 . For the general statutory mandates of the national forests, national parks, wildlife refuges,
and wilderness areas, see Mansfield, supra note 2, at 831.
25 . The Forest Service was founded in 1891; Pinchot assumed the directorship in 1898. In
1905, the agency was renamed the Forest Service and the nation's forest reserves were transferred from
the Department of Interior to the Department of Agriculture. Huffman, supra note 21, at 258, 265-67.
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tion.26  They were not placed off-limits to commercial exploitation. Timber
could be sold in national forests. Additionally, to appease mineral interests, the
forests were open to location under the Mining Law of 1872.27 The Mineral
Leasing Act also applied in national forests28 and grazing was allowed.29 Gen-
erally, "wild areas" that were set aside from such uses by administrative action
were not areas of interest to timber companies. A later statute, the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 1960,30 supplemented the purposes for which national
forests would be managed, but these purposes were deemed secondary to timber
and watershed concerns.
3 1
Other specialized areas also took into account private interests in various
ways. National Park administration appears restrictive, with mining and timber
sales generally not allowed, 32 but some of the initial park designations were in
areas that did not have huge attractions for either miners or timber companies.
In a similar compromise, when Congress finally provided general management
guidance for the Wildlife Refuges in the 1960's, 33 it allowed uses of refuges in
addition to wildlife protection, 34 but provided the Fish and Wildlife Service
with guidance about prioritizing uses of the refuges.
3 5
In contrast to these specialized land management regimes arising out of res-
ervations, the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"), an agency of the Depart-
ment of Interior, manages that portion of the "public domain" which had not
26. Ste United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (interpreting the Organic Admini-
stration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482 (1988)). "Protection" of the forests, a seeming third func-
tion, was only operative in regard to the watershed and timber purposes. Id at 707 n.14.
27. The Forest Service Organic Act forbids action that would "prohibit any person from enter-
ing upon such national forests for all proper and lawful purposes, including that of prospecting,
locating, and developing the mineral resources thereof." 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1988). See infra note 216 and
accompanying text.
28 . 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988).
29 . Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911). The first statute in the area was passed in 1950.
16 U.S.C. §§ 580k-5801 (1988) (setting up advisory boards and authorizing permitting).
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988).
31 . Id. § 528:
[Tihe national forests are established and shall be administered for outdoor recrea-
tion, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes. The purposes of...
this title are declared to be supplemental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes
for which the national forests were established as set forth in ... [the Organic Ad-
ministration Act of 1897].
For further discussion, see Mansfield, supra note 2, at 852-57.
32 . See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 844.
33 . Prior to that, and to a certain extent thereafter, individual statutes or executive withdrawal
actions provided management criteria.
34 . See Refuge Recreation Act of 1962, 16 U.S.C. § 460k to k.4 (1988); Refuge Revenue Sharing
Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 715s (1988); National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16
U.S.C. § 668dd-668ee (1988).
35 . The Refuge Recreation Act authorizes recreational use of refuges, but only as an
"appropriate incidental or secondary use" and "only to the extent that is practicable and not inconsis-
tent with ... the primary objectives for which each particular area is established." 16 U.S.C. § 460k
(1988). The later Refuge Administration Act expressly states that the Recreation Act will govern rec-
reational uses. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(h) (1988). The Refuge Administration Act allows uses other than
recreation under a second standard, namely when they are "compatible with the major purposes for
which such areas were established." 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(1)(A) (1988).
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been reserved for other purposes.3 6 Initially, the BLM was a merger of the Gen-
eral Land Office and the Grazing Service37 and it adopted the perspectives of its
predecessors. The General Land Office had been responsible for disposal of
lands and resources under various homestead laws, state land grants, and mineral
laws.38 The Grazing Service managed grazing districts under the Taylor Grazing
Act of 193439 "pending disposal." The BLM received the image of being simply
a conduit through which private enterprise would receive its rightful share of the
public resources or lands.40 Congress began to redefine the agency's role with
the Multiple Use and Surface Protection Act of 195541 and the Classification
and Multiple Use Act of 1964,42 which directed the agency to manage and clas-
sify lands for different purposes.
One of the most vivid illustrations of the changing nature of the BLM was
the picture with which it represented itself.43 Prior to 1965, the BLM's emblem
had a surveyor, a logger, an oil driller, a cowboy, and a miner in the foreground.
The background contained a wagon train and an indistinct oil field or industrial
building. Its revised emblem is triangular, with a winding river extending from
the bottom to its top, which depicts a mountain. A conifer tree is also in the
foreground. The agency, at least in its public emblem, sought to replace the user
groups with a depiction of the land itself. A changing population, however,
demanded greater change.
44
In 1976, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA") provided
the organic act for at least a partially re-visualized agency. Although grazing and
36. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding no implied water rights for
BLM lands because they are public domain, not reservations). Nevertheless, portions of the BLM
lands may have been withdrawn or reserved for specific management purposes by the BLM. For
example, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 directed the BLM to withdraw stock water holes
and driveways under the Pickett Act. 43 U.S.C. § 300 (repealed 1976).
37. See George C. Coggins & Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Man-
agement 11: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL L. 1, 54-68 (1982).
38 . The agency did not always meet the congressional goals of these acts. See Sheldon L.
Greene, Promised Land- A Contemporary Critique of Distribution of Public Land by the United States, 5
ECOL LQ. 707, 750-51 (1976) (predatory economic interests of large landholders and railroads per-
verted nineteenth century land laws from equitable distributive goals and distorted twentieth century
reclamation law). See also PATRICIA N. LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST
OF THE AMERICAN WEST 296, 298 (1987) (arguing western history infused with "business as usual"
philosophy).
39 . 43 U.S.C. § 315-315r (1988). See generally NRDC v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal.1985).40. For a summary of the major trends in statutory enactments, see George C. Coggins, The
Public Interest in Public Land Law: A Commentary on the Policies of Secretary Watt, 4 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1,
9-10 (1983) (accurately noting a stage existed between land disposal and land retention in which re-
sources were disposed).
41 . 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-615 (1988).
42. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (expired 1970).
43. See JAMES MUHN & HANSON R. STEWART, OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE: THE STORY OF
THE BLM 116 (1988).
44. Marion Clawson, The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 in a Broad Historical
Perspeitive, 21 ARIz. L REV. 585, 595-96 (1979) (tracing FLPMA's origins to demographic, economic,
social, and political trends that brought a "larger total population, including more older persons in
retirement and more younger persons physically and ideologically active").
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mineral functions remain strong elements of the BLM's role,45 FLPMA makes
planning one of its central functions.46 To a certain extent, however, FLPMA
represents a stand-off between those seeking to exploit and those seeking to pre-
serve the public lands because FLPMA requires the BLM to consider disparate
values in meeting the "national interest," but it does not demand a result.47
Congress did not order the BLM to place either resource use or non-use in a
favored position throughout its jurisdiction or on any specific tract.48 In fact,
the statute has been labeled "internally inconsistent, reflecting different concerns
of environmentalists, miners, and ranchers."
49
Nevertheless, some argue that FLPMA has an aura of environmental protec-
tion throughout it.50  Others maintain the opposite.5 1  Two facts fuel these
divergent views. In addition to FLPMA's lack of an overriding management
goal, the second source of the dispute is that other statutes also operate on the
public lands and influence its management. More particularly, FLPMA identi-
fies the principal or major uses of the BLM lands as "domestic livestock grazing,
fish and wildlife development and utilization, mineral exploration and produc-
45 . See, e.g., Title IV of FLPMA, codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1753, 315b, 315j (1988) (grazing
amendments); id . 1701(a)(12) (manage to promote food and mineral production); id. § 1702(/) (major
or principal uses include domestic livestock grazing and mineral exploration and production). See
also Public Rangeland Improvement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601-1629e (1988).
46 . The first policy enunciated in the Act emphasized that "the public lands [should] be retai-
ned in Federal ownership, unless as a result of land use planning procedure provided for in this Act,
it is determined that the disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national interest." 43 U.S.C.
§ 1701(a)(1) (1988). See generalo George C. Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning on the
Federal Lands, 61 COLo. L. REV. 307, 316-33 (1990).
47. Clawson, supra note 44, at 585 (temporary lull in debates); Raymond A. Peck Jr., "Mnd Then
There Were None"- Evolving Federal Restraints on the Availability of Public Lands for Mineral Development, 25
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3-1, 3-14, 3-15 (1979) (arguing that debate between developing or preserv-
ing lands and who should decide the issue pre-dated the Constitution).
48. Maria E. Mansfield, The "Public" in Public Land Appeals: A Case Study in "Reformed" Admin-
istrative Law and Proposal for Orderly Participation, 12 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 465, 490-94 (1988). In one
respect, taking a broader view may lessen the dilemma. As one judge put it: "Some lands can be
preserved, while others, more appropriately, can be mined." State v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1003
(D. Utah 1979).
49. State v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 1002. Congress's commands to the BLM include, inter
alia, directives to both encourage mining as well as preserve land in its natural condition. See 43
U.S.C. § 1701 (policy section). Decisions the BLM makes in regard to public lands therefore are
polycentric and made with multiple criteria and no overriding substantive guide post. Mansfield,
supra note 48, at 499. FLPMA does require "consideration" of diverse values and other procedural
steps, which may indirectly moderate BLM activity. Id at 494-95.
50. NRDC v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (FLPMA gives environmental tinge to
range duties); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), affd on other grounds sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding environmental goals in policy section to
provide direction and duty but means to goal is discretionary). For commentary emphasizing envi-
ronmental mandate, see, e.g., Perry R. Hagenstein, Public Lands and Environmental Concerns, 21 ARIZ. L.
REV. 449, 451 (1979); George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV FLPMA, PRIA,
and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL L 1, 26-32 (1983).
51 . Peck, supra note 47, at 3-13 (limiting development contrary to "national policies and statu-
tory mandates"); William R. Marsh & Don H. Sherwood, Metamorphosis in Mining Law: Federal Legisla-
tive and Regulatory Amendment and Supplementation of the General Mining Law Since 1955, 26 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L INST. 209, 250-72 (1980) (arguing Congress ultimately required mineral independence).
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tion, rights-of-way, outdoor recreation, and timber production." 52 While some of
these uses are regulated under FLPMA, 53 others also are subject to independent
statutes.54 The BLM is therefore most definitely not a single purpose agency.
55
This thumbnail sketch of public land history shows that in numerous in-
stances, private parties have had the opportunity to develop public land re-
sources. Nevertheless, Congress has also determined that the public lands, both
those managed by the BLM and lands in other management systems, should also
be available for recreational, aesthetic, wildlife, and ecological purposes.
III. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
To come to grips with the concept of "public" versus "private" interests in
public lands, it is necessary to identify the nature of public lands. The public
lands are, on one level, what the name implies: they are lands titled in the gov-
ernment and thus, they seemingly belong to the citizenry at large. Nevertheless,
the public lands cannot be viewed historically as either true common property
nor true property owned by no one because of the congressional power over the
lands.56 Congress may dictate their uses. This does not mean that no citizens
express care and concern over the use of public lands.57 Many do and some are
quick to label those supporting grazing, mining, cabin-sites, or even commercial
rafting permits as champions of "private" rights, but label those supporting wil-
derness, wetland preservation, or species preservation as forwarding "public" val-
ues. If, however, "public" means serving the interest of the community, and
"private" means serving the interest of the individual, it may be a conceptual
error to separate the "public" from the individuals within it. The terms "public"
and "private," if used to describe community or individual returns, may be simi-
lar to that proverbial glass of water, which may be half full or half empty de-
pending on perspective. A different terminology is in order, one that does not
automatically tar one perspective as selfish and one perspective as altruistic. Part
52. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(l) (1988). Under the concept of multiple use management, however,
other uses may be considered. Id § 1702(c).
53. See, eg., FLPMA Subchapter V, governing rights-of-way. 43 U.S.C. § 1761. FLPMA also
governs sales and exchanges of public lands and planning and administration.
54 . See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 835-37.
55 . An occasional court case may declare that a particular statute it enforces has a singular
purpose. See, eg., Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113, 1117-18 (D. Nev. 1989) (holding primary intent
of grazing statutes to be livestock protection).
56. Cf Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (Rights
of Indians "do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land."); see also text
accompanying notes 11-15.
57 . Compare Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commre and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 712 (1986) ("From this [tragedy of the commons produces waste]
perspective, 'public property' is an oxymoron: things left open to the public are not property at all,
but rather its antithesis.") with Robert H. Nelson, Private Rights to Government Actions: How Modem
Property Rights Evolve, 1986 U. ILL L. REV. 361, 373 (arguing that President Reagan's plans to sell pub-
lic lands were thwarted by disparate users: "The Reagan Administration tried to sell someone else's
property, and the owners reacted to the threat as vigorously as would any other private owners.").
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of this linguistic transformation is to recognize that the traditional "public" val-
ues are of two types, one of which is similar to traditional "private" values.
Many of the so-called public interests represent the individual preferences,
desires, or convictions 58 of the parties supporting them. The wilderness advo-
cate might vacation in a wilderness area in a backpack tent. Wilderness may also
promote liberty by aiding an individual to understand his or her heritage.
59
The wildlife or wetland advocate may have personal interest such as hunting or
photography. More importantly, the advocate may have embraced the ethic of
environmentalism as fervently as any religious tenet.60  Religion, while often
resulting in commitments to assist others, is also a private and individual en-
richment. Therefore, the oft-labeled public values are benefiting specific indi-
viduals within the community.
Conversely, if forwarding the community interest includes benefiting indi-
viduals within the community, then it must be recognized that grazers, miners,
and commercial outfitters are individually part of the "public," part of the
community to be served. The mining company itself also pays taxes and pro-
vides jobs, both activities that forward community interest. Similarly, an indi-
vidual rancher supports local businesses. The commercial outfitter performs an
additional function beyond spreading an economic return. The outfitter allows
those not personally trained to be able to take a trip down the river or into the
back country. Many might say that despite the outfitter's profit, the outfitter
offers a "public" or community service-at least to those individuals who partake
of the outfitter's offer of assistance. 6 1 Public and private interests therefore blur,
if the test of these labels is whether an individual or the community benefits.
Nevertheless, some values tend to align against general consumer desires.
62
Maintaining environmental integrity, be it preserving wilderness, wetlands, or
58. See Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393, 1411
(1981) (explaining that a "conviction" represents a party's beliefs about what is appropriate policy for
society and differs from a desire).
59. James L. Huffman, Governing America's Resources: Federalism in the 1980's, 12 ENVTL L 863,
898 (1982) (arguing public ownership of wildland in national parks and wilderness areas promotes
liberty).
60. See generally William D. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Protection: A Brief History of the Envi-
ronmental Movement in America and the Implications Abroad, 15 ENVrL L 455 (1985).
61 . The controversy over the allocation of river running permits between commercial and
non-commercial activities epitomizes this looking-glass dilemma: does the "public" consist of those
fit and trained enough to run the river alone or does it consist of those who can simply afford the
price of a seat on a commercial river run? See Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Andrus, 446 U.S. 982 (1980).
62. See Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us; or Conflict and Contradiction in Envi-
ronmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L 283, 284 (1982) (dichotomy between consumers and citizens). As Profes-
sor Sagoff noted when his students expressed their preference to keep Mineral King mountain unde-
veloped, despite their desire to ski on its slopes:
The skiers themselves may believe, on ideological grounds, that the wilderness should
be preserved, even if that belief conflicts with their own consumer preferences.
Thus, this conflict pits the consumer against himself as a citizen or as a member of
a moral community. The conflict arises not only among us but within us. It con-
fronts what I want as an individual with what I believe as a citizen.
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biological diversity, often means foregoing development. Unlike timber and
other commodity resources, wilderness and other environmental values do not
lend themselves to traditional economic or even multiple use analyses. Tradi-
tional economic analysis, which employs market values, does not apply well to
environmental amenities because they are not readily traded in a priced context.
Land managers are familiar with multiple use planning, which does not necessar-
ily require dollar equivalents. 63 Multiple use planning, however, often is inter-
preted to search out uses that are compatible with other uses and some environ-
mental considerations, such as wilderness, often require maintenance of the
status quo.
64
In addition to its seeming lack of economic return,65 maintaining envi-
ronmental integrity may be further categorized by comparing it to certain activi-
ties that must be the subject of a central government. Creation of these "public
goods" requires collective action and the benefits of the activity cannot be par-
celed out individually. Defense is a good example. No one can individually
protect all borders and no one person can be excluded from the benefits of a
rigorous defense. 66 Similarly, ecologically sound land management benefits are
beyond the capacity of any one person to control. This can be illustrated by
cataloguing some homocentric and pragmatic benefits of environmental preser-
vation: wetlands provide water filtration and flood control,67 biological diver-
sity may present opportunities for pharmaceutical advances, 68 and healthy for-
Id at 302-03. See also Joseph L Sax, The Legitimacy of Collective Values The Case of the Public Lands, 56 U.
COLO. L. REv. 537, 542 (1985) (contrasting "collective" versus "individualistic"). Compare Frank I.
Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review, 13 CREIGHTON L REV.
487, 509 (1979) (contrasting "individualistically self-serving activity" of private sphere with "joint and
mutual search for good and right answers" of public life) with Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to
Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL L. REV. 337, 343 (criticizing Michelman for drawing too sharp a division
because all aspects of life provide opportunities for both).
63 . See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 853.
64. See Thomas M. Rickert, Wilderness Land Preservation: The Uneasy Reconciliation of Multiple and
Single Use Land Management Policies, 8 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L REV. 873, 915-17 (1980).
65 . Tourism is, however, a vibrant economic benefit of some preservation efforts.
66. Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine An Economic Penpective, 29 CAL W. L REV. 239,
255-56 (1992) (explaining consumption of public goods "entails no rivaly among consumers and the
exclusion principle does not operate" (emphasis added)). See also Christopher K. Lehman & Robert H.
Nelson, The Rise of Managerial Federalism: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, 12 ENVTL L. 981, 1001-02
(1982); cf Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL W. L REv. 187, 191 (1992)
(common property should exist where "the cost of exclusion is high relative to its social benefits").
Epstein, however, does not believe that government ownership and regulation is necessarily the proper
response. Id. at 201. He advocates purchase of property interests (e.g., easements) needed for wildlife
concerns. Id. at 202-03.
67. Cohen, supra note 66, at 255. Wetlands also provide for migrating wildfowl, which have
also been used as an illustration of a public good. They are enjoyed not only by those that visit the
nesting grounds, but by those who see the birds flying overhead and are simply reassured that the
species continue. Id.
68. The Endangered Species Act, however, goes beyond preserving potential economic value
from plants and animals. It is concerned with the loss of the "aesthetic, ecological, educational,
historical, recreational and scientific value." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (1982). See also Holmes Rolston, III,
Poperty Rights and Endangered Species, 61 U. COLO. L REV. 282, 294-97 (1990).
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ests provide watersheds to supply drinking and irrigation water. 69  Environmen-
tally sensitive use of the public lands is therefore a "public good.
70
The nature of these concerns leads one to relabel some aspects of environ-
mental protection, a concern which is often identified with the so-called "public
rights." One new label would be "non-consumptive" uses. This reflects the fact
that most conflicts between "private" rights and environmental protection take
place when specific resource development is proposed. To complete the dichot-
omy, the so-called "private" rights should be considered either "consumptive,"
because resources are to be developed, or "exclusionary," because the "private"
owner wants exclusive control over the resource. In looking at the public or
non-consumptive rights, moreover, it must be recognized that these rights are of
two types: "public/individual" and "public/collective."
The "public individual rights" represent those uses of the public lands that
are to be enjoyed by individual members of the public on a non-exclusive or
non-consumptive basis, recognizing that sometimes the forwarding of one type
of non-consumptive use may actually exclude other such uses71 and that some
presumptively non-consumptive uses may actually become consumptive in the
face of over-use.72  The "public/collective" rights differ from the individual
rights because their benefits do not flow to specific individuals in the commu-
nity. These collective rights encompass what would be necessary to preserve an
ecosystem for the benefit of humanity in general and throughout time. Such
protection enters into the creation of "public goods" that are valued even with-
out use.
Exclusionary or consumptive rights can be both contrasted with and com-
pared with non-consumptive or collective uses. They differ from collective rights
because an exclusionary or consumptive right begins with a benefit to a specified
individual, a benefit that in some circumstances may diminish what is available
for others to use or enjoy. But despite the fact that an individual may benefit,
the grant of the exclusionary or consumptive right may be a method chosen by
Congress to forward some aspect of community needs. For example, grazing and
mineral rights are granted to individuals, but the rationale behind the statutes
creating the rights is to forward the public good. Therefore, "public" and
"private" rights may be difficult to distinguish if the feature believed to distin-
guish these two spheres is whether individual or community benefits are being
promoted.
69 . In fact, securing favorable water flows and timber production were the twin lodestars of
the early forest service. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
70. Cf Leman & Nelson, supra note 66, at 1002 (few true public goods exist except in natural
resources field); see also Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Penpective on
the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL L 847, 851-52 (1982) (arguing federal ownership of public domain
protected vital national interest).
71 . The conflicts between hikers and mountain bikers or cross-country skiers and snowmobil-
ers are examples.
72. Problems of "loving wildernesses to death" come to mind.
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IV. INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PUBLIC VALUES AS PROPERTY
Property has been defined in numerous ways. It also has been characterized
as serving at least two purposes.73  Under the Madison/Lockean or "liberal"
concept, property serves an individual's needs; government exists to protect prop-
erty and to promote the ideal of individuality. The Jeffersonian/Rousseauean
concept imbues property with a social purpose; through ownership of property a
citizen gains values necessary to participate meaningfully in government.
74
Hence, societal needs color "ownership." The dialectic between these positions
permeates American law, and can explain some of the seemingly contradictory
court decisions. 75  Moreover, from the recognition that the so-called "public"
rights are both individual and collective, the dignity of these rights may be rein-
forced by correlating them to more traditional "rights."
The traditional liberal definition of property is "the group of rights inher-
ing in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it."76 Nevertheless, even Blackstone, who is often cited for this formu-
lation,77 notes that property "consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of
all [a person's] acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the
laws of the land."78 Blackstone's final caveat emphasizes that potential restraints
exist and these restraints on individual use of property may be propelled by the
social aspect of property. Property is not a true dyadic relationship involving
73. In addition to the individual and societal purposes, a second dichotomy is between view-
ing land as existing in the "transformative economy" or in the "economy of nature." Joseph L Sax,
Property Rights and the Economy of Nature Undetanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45
STAN. L REv. 1433, 144246 (1993). The first theory views land as a distinct entity that can be made
into a human artifact; the latter views land as "consisting of systems defined by their function, not by
man-made boundaries." Id. at 1442. Consider also the argument that land itself may demand to be
used in a manner that suits its place in the natural ecological chain; no one should have the right to
modify or destroy its natural systems. See eg., David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A
Call for Judicial Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL L
REV. 311 (1988); Lynton K. Caldwell, Land and the Law: Problems in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U. ILL L
REV. 319; Michael B. Metzger, Private Property and Environmental Sanity, 5 ECOL L.Q. 793 (1976).
74. See, eg., Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Property, 9 CONST.
COMMENTARY 259 (1992); Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause. Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFF. L REV. 735,
754-58 (1985); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed- Wy the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL L
REV. 561, 594-97 (1984) (property serves "proaquisitive" and "prosocial" positions).
75 . It has also been inaccurately characterized as a distinction between the "nineteenth-century
world of the common law and the twentieth-century world of the modern regulatory state." Gary
Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and Sovereignty in the Post Modern Erm. The Regulatory Takings Problem,
62 COLO. L REv. 599, 621 (1991). Nineteenth century cases also display the social side of the prop-
erty dialectic. See infra text accompanying notes 187-88.
76 . United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945). For an explication of the
"liberal" concept of property, see Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in
the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988) and Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and
Resurrection, 1987 SuP. Cr. RE. 1.
77. "[Tlhe right of property ... [is] that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other indi-
vidual in the universe." 2 WILLtAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
78. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "138 (emphasis added).
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only an owner and a thing.
79
A second, and perhaps more intriguing definitional exercise, is to examine
property from the viewpoint of expectation:
The idea of property consists in an established expectation; in the persua-
sion of being able to draw such or such an advantage from the thing pos-
sessed .... Now this expectation, . . . can only be the work of law. I can-
not count upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as mine, except
through the promise of the law which guarantees it to me.... Property
and law are born together, and die together.
80
Expectations, if backed by law, create the foundations of property interests. This
construct recognizes the interrelationship between individuals and their society.
Because of the use of reasonable expectations in takings jurisprudence, the nature
of expectations in regard to public.lands is important.
Generally, expectation analysis has concentrated on the consumptive or. ex-
clusionary interest. For example, questions focused on whether a private propo-
nent had a statutory or contractual right to develop the resource81 or on
whether an enterprise was so pervasively regulated that more regulation could be
anticipated.82 However, in the public lands context, where lands have not been
developed or consumptively used, there could be an expectation that the status
quo would continue, and the lands would therefore remain in their present
state.8 3 This expectation could influence the so-called public rights.
The expectation can be attached to both the "public/individual" interests
and the "public/collective" interests. Obviously, the user of a tract of public
land for hunting or hiking maintains a subjective expectation that the land will
remain available for these pursuits. Similarly, the park visitor will anticipate
returning to the park, perhaps when the infant in the baby carrier is able to
navigate a trail on two feet. The expectation interest, however, goes beyond indi-
vidual users.
If a person never used a park, it does not mean that member of the public
does not value the land for being a park. It is perhaps safe to say that no citizen
would want Yellowstone Park destroyed even if that person did not plan to visit
79. Daniel W. Bromley, Regulatory Takings: Coherent Concept or Logical Contradiction, 17 VT. L
REv. 647, 648-56 (1993).
80. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 112-13.
81 . Compare Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 750-51 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding regulation
promulgated after issuance of an oil and gas lease may be a taking) with Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d
465, 482-84 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in part and remanded sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Alaska,
439 U.S. 922 (1978) (finding no taking if lease terminated pursuant to clause in lease forbidding
development if unacceptable harm would result).
82 . See Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 758 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811
(1990) (upholding Uniform Mill Tailings Control Act); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power
& Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983) (regulated industry should anticipate additional regulation).
83. Cf. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L REv. 185, 186-94 (1980) (arguing ,public trust doctrine "prevent[s] the destabilizing disap-
pointment of expectations held in common
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it. Certain goods have "existence value;" the simple fact that they exist enriches
the collective consciousness even if never used. Wilderness is often identified as
a resource that provides such benefits.8 4 Thus, there is an expectation that these
values will be maintained. This may also be true in regard to wetlands, wildlife,
and some other environmental values. There may be an "ecological expectation"
of their continued existence because of their importance in the ecosystem. The
collective or ecological expectation, however, may run into the private, consump-
tive expectation that an owner of "private property" maintains about his or her
ability to make use of the property for profit or individual pleasure.
85
Because two rights reside in the same resource, to a certain extent what is
created are correlative rights in the resource. The correlative rights doctrine first
emerged in the oil and gas setting to reconcile rights to a truly common re-
source, an underground oil and gas reservoir from which all owners of minerals
in lands overlying the pool have rights to remove oil and gas.86 As the Supreme
Court in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana8 7 explained:
It follows from the essence of their right and from the situation of the
things, as to which it can be exerted, that the use by one of his power to
seek to convert a part of the common fund to actual possession may result
in an undue proportion being attributed to one of the possessors of the
right to the detriment of the others, or by waste by one or more to the an-
nihilation of the rights of the remainder.
88
Because of the communal nature of the legal rights and the physical object of
these rights, a state legislature could intervene and regulate the manner of pro-
duction. The Supreme Court found such legislation did limit "property" rights
gained under the Rule of Capture, but was not a taking of private property; it
labeled the statute as one "protecting private property and preventing it from
being taken by one of the common owners without regard to the enjoyment of
the others."
89
Naturally, the oil and gas situation is not perfectly analogous to the relation-
ship of "private" rights and "public" rights, either public/individual or pub-
lic/collective. Each owner of a right to produce from the common oil and gas
reservoir has a legally recognized "co-equal" right to produce. The dignity of
these "public" rights to the public lands has not been elevated to co-equal status
with the private consumptive or exclusionary property rights across the board.
84. Lehman & Nelson, supra note 66, at 1002 (support by distant citizens show wildernesses
and parks to be true public goods valued for their existence). Cf. Sax, supra note 62, at 551-52 (some
value arises from the "bandwagon" effect; individual values wilderness because community deems it
important).
85 . That is, the ability to make use of it in the "transformative economy." Sax, supra note 73,
at 1442.
86. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1900); see Mansfield, supra note 13, at 72-74.
87. 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
88. Id. at 210.
89. Id.
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These "rights" only emerge as legally protected rights when Congress declares that
the public lands shall be managed for these purposes. Moreover, the public
rights probably should not be elevated in one leap to such co-equal property
rights because thoughts about property rights tend to evolve slowly. As a result,
subjecting these rights to cataclysmic change could destabilize society as a whole.
In fact, simply elevating these collective concerns to "property" status could
have an unintended drawback. If the government regulates private consumptive
or exclusionary interests that also are "property" expectations, the gain to the
collective or to the individual public interests could be equated with acquiring an
interest for the benefit of governmental property.90 Under some theories, this
could create a compensable taking.91 Takings analysis, however, is more com-
plex than simply labeling a governmental action one that appropriates a benefit.
Moreover, before the issue of takings may arise, the agency must first decide how
to reconcile the conflicting interests.
V. AGENCY RECONCILIATION OF COMPETING INTERESTS
Parties with purported rights to use land, either actual public land owned by
the federal government 92 or land adjacent to such lands,93 may discover their
desired development would impact on some public rights, be they of the indi-
vidual or collective type. The land managing agency with jurisdiction must then
reconcile the conflicting interests. Unless there is a statute that mandates a spe-
cific result,94 there is room for balancing.
The BLM's lands and some of the other publicly held lands may be subject
to statutes that have seemingly diametrically opposed goals. These include stat-
utes that promote mining95 and those that promote wilderness.96  Not even
these purposeful statutes necessarily enshrine one value over all else: the Mineral
90. Defining the takings issue as compensating for property "appropriated" can lead to word
play- a restriction on use could "appropriate" a negative easement. See Frank I. Michelman, Propery,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L REV.
1165, 1186-87 (1967).
91. Compare William B. Stoebuck, Police Power Taking, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L REV.
1057, 1091-93 (1980) (stating such a benefit would arguably be a taking) with Joseph L Sax, Takings,
P'rivate Property and Public Rghts, 81 YALE LJ. 149, 177-78 (1971) (arguing not necessarily a taking if
benefit required to protect the public).
92 . For example, a mineral lease, grazing lease, timber contract, mining claim, concession con-
tract, or cabin-site lease allows some consumptive or exclusionary uses of lands technically owned by
the federal government. The nature of the right to use may be defined by statute or regulation. See
infra notes 225-26.
93. For the reach of the Property Clause beyond federally owned property, see Mansfield, supra
note 13, at 52-56.
94. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1978) (interpreting the Endan-
gered Species Act as removing equitable discretion from both the agency and the courts).
95 . Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1988); Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-227
(1988); Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1988); National Materials and Min-
erals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1605 (1988).
96 . Se, e.g., Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988).
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Leasing Act requires consideration of surface values97 and the Wilderness Act
acknowledges existing private mineral rights and allowed for initiation of new
rights for a time.98 Indeed, even the National Park Service Organic Act also has
inherent tension; the Park Service is to preserve its resources and at the same
time provide for the enjoyment of future generations.
99
Acts governing other specialized land regimes provide for some development
in these areas, but also give guidance on priorities. The National Wildlife Ref-
uges are to be managed primarily for wildlife and whatever additional values may
be especially noted in the executive order or statute creating the refuge. 100 Simi-
larly, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act ("the Rivers Act") requires the managing
agency to administer a designated river "to protect and enhance the values which
caused it to be included in said system without, insofar as is consistent therewith,
limiting other uses that do not substantially interfere with public use and en-
joyment of these values." 10 1 Under the Rivers Act, Congress decides to preserve
the area, but the agency determines whether a proposed activity violates the Act's
protective thrust. Because interference with protected values must be
"substantial" before it is forbidden, there is extensive discretion within the agen-
cies.102 Despite the discretion afforded under these acts, the BLM and the For-
est Service, which are governed by multiple use mandates, most vividly show the
potential for conflicts in their laundry lists of policies and management
goals.
103
For example, FLPMA allows the BLM considerable discretion in managing
the public lands. Because FLPMA does not direct the BLM to favor any one
interest, it may balance conflicting interests that affect particular parcels of land.
Thus, the BLM could, under FLPMA's command to prevent "unnecessary or
undue degradation" 104 of the public lands, declare that an activity could be
"unduly degrading" because it would cause excessive environmental harm or pre-
clude an inordinate number of alternative uses of the public lands. It could
balance rights, looking to the admittedly imperfect analogy of correlative
rights. 105 Under such a balancing approach, the BLM would not condemn an
activity, such as a mine or a road, without also looking at its potential for praise.
97. 30 U.S.C. § 226 (g) (1988).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2)-4d)(3) (1988).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
100. See Schwenke v. Secretary of Interior, 720 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1983) (construing manage-
ment priorities for Russell Range); spra notes 33-35; see also Mansfield, supra note 2, at 846-48.
101 . 16 U.S.C. § 1281(a) (1988).
102. Wilderness Soc'y v. Tyrrel, 701 F. Supp. 1473, 1478-79 (E.D. Cal. 1988). Compare with
other acts requiring agency discretion within protective framework, Oregon Natural Resources Coun-
cil v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1989) (Hells Canyon National Recreation Area Act); Izaak Walton
League v. St. Clair, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974) (Wilderness Act).
103 . See Mansfield, supra note 48, at 490-99.
104 . 43 U.S.C. '§ 1732(b) (1988) (dealing with general land use); id. § 1782(c) (dealing with in-
terim management of wilderness study areas when grandfathered uses or valid existing rights in-
volved).
105 . See generaly Mansfield, supra note 13 (fully developing and initially presenting arguments
that follow).
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The balancing exercise, however, must employ value judgments. The BLM
cannot rely totally on the seeming neutrality of numerical cost-benefit analysis.
This technique, which monetizes both benefits and costs of a proposal, is more
attuned to ranking competing development proposals. It is less helpful when the
decision is between development and preserving collective or non-consumptive
rights. 10 6  Moreover, absolute neutrality is neither possible nor desirable as a
goal for an agency such as the BLM. Inevitably, managing the public lands re-
quires value judgments. Therefore, rather than hiding behind the mask of nu-
merical balancing, the agency should accept this truth and make value judgments
openly so all will know the basis of its choices.
Before making such choices, a land managing agency imbued with discretion
must hear the arguments in favor of differing allocative choices in full. 10 7 If the
agency must solve conflicting demands without firm guidance from Congress,
the interest representation model of administrative law would be especially suited
to its resource allocation decisions. 10 8  The agency's eventual decision should
promote what it determines to be the public interest. This task requires a judg-
mental conclusion and therefore differs from simply reflecting the sum of all
"votes" of interested persons. 10 9 In some cases, this process will lead to the con-
clusion that development should be halted or greatly modified, but in other
situations development will be allowed to proceed. The agency must exercise
106 . Two difficulties emerge. First, it is difficult to "price" certain environmental costs and
benefits. Therefore, the results of cost-benefit analysis may be weighted in favor of proposals that will
produce benefits more easily rendered into dollars. Second, the analysis may give value judgments a
veneer of scientific respectability because environmental amenities are given dollar equivalents, even if
the methodology behind such exercises may be questionable. See general4 Mansfield, supra note 13, at
83-84; see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs and Risks. Ovenight of Health and Environmental
Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENvTL L REv. 191, 194-201 (1980); Ralph C. d'Arge, A Practical Guide to
Economic Valuation of the Natural Environment, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 5-1 (1989). Moreover,
once reaching one "right" answer justified by a maximization approach, the administrative process
may appear to be completed and an agency would be less responsive to changed circumstances. Martin
Shapiro, APA: Pas4 Presen4 Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447, 454-56 (1986).
107 . The interest representation model of administrative law requires such agency openness to
public input. Professor Stewart was the first to note that many agencies had come to resemble mini-
egislatures, and that therefore a primary goal of administrative law should be to assure representation
of all interests in this new forum. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARv. L. Rwv. 1669 (1975).
108. See generally Mansfield, supra note 48, at 498-99. Allowing all affected parties to partici-
pate ensures all resources are spoken for, broadens the agency's information base, and provides a basic
ingredient of the democratic process, namely the representation without which laws should not be
made. Id. at 513-14.
109. See Coggins, supra note 40, at 24-26 (arguing that the search for the public interest is cru-
cial to government although it is an elusive and changing standard). Agencies, however, tend to re-
gard the "public interest" as being served when a decision is made that best accommodates the desires
of those demanding attention, rather than looking beyond the goals of these parties. PAUL J.
CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE FOREST SERVICE AND THE
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 208-31 (1981); Charles A. Reich, The Public and the Nation's Forsts, 50
CAL L REV. 381, 406 (1962); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Sef-lnteres and the APA: Four Lessons Since
1946, 72 VA. L REV. 271 (1986).
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discretion in each individual setting without preconceived frameworks.11 0 Nev-
ertheless, some guiding principles exist.
First, a land managing agency need not halt all activities that disturb re-
sources on the public lands or which are incompatible with either type of
"public right." Despite potential expectations about the status quo continuing,
public land management need not be static.111  Therefore, only those private
consumptive or exclusionary enterprises that threaten core public values should
be curbed. 112 These values include wildernesses and lands important for water-
shed protection, recreational activities, and wildlife preservation. Second, devel-
opment need not necessarily be foreclosed even if it threatens these or other public
land functions. The public benefits from the activity, such as jobs, minerals, and
independence from reliance on foreign sources, enter the equation. In some in-
stances, the gains from development will justify the loss of environmental values.
Therefore, if an agency is interpreting an open-ended mandate such as pre-
venting "unnecessary or undue degradation," it should employ a sliding scale.
To do so, the nature of the proposed private action is important. Minerals, of
course, can only be mined at locales that nature provides, but pipelines, hotels,
and condominiums may often be sited in numerous locales. Therefore, the
availability of alternatives for both the "private" and "public" rights are impor-
tant. Moreover, even if a mineral is involved, further consideration is needed.
The relative scarcity of both the mineral resource and the threatened collective
resources will influence the decision. For example, development of a particularly
rare or major mineral deposit could justify more usurpation of other resources
than smaller or more common deposits. Conversely, lands serving major eco-
logical or recreational interests could demand more vigorous preservation than
other public lands.
113
Ultimately, private activities should be precluded only if they would affect
public lands that provide significant collective and individual public benefits.
110 . Discretion, in and of itself, is not necessarily an evil. The BLM personnel can provide
crucial professional knowledge and initiative. Congress has neither the time nor the expertise to
either define national policy completely or manage each acre of public lands. Therefore, it must dele-
gate discretion. Mansfield, supra note 48, at 496-97.
111 . Compare Joseph L Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L REv. 471, 482 (1970) (government may accommodate new needs by reallocat-
ing resources even if uses of property subject to public trust change) with Sax, supra note 83, at 186
(public trust doctrine not rigid prohibition of change).
112. Cf. Eugene R. Gaetke, The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978: Regulating
Nonfederal Property Under the Property Clause, 60 OR. L REV. 157, 183 (1981) (only allow land managing
agencies to regulate activity beyond the borders of their lands when imperative to preserve congres-
sional policy about federal property use); Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern
Property Law, 41 STAN. L REv. 1529, 1553-56 (1989) (should not restructure property rights in water on
a wholesale basis, but only to preserve crucial values).
113 . Acknowledging the BLM's authority to forbid activity would not necessarily be a defeat
for mineral interests or other developers. If the BLM has this power, its decision-making would con-
sider placing environmental concerns above development. If, after this review, the BLM allows the
activity, the public interest decision would deserve more deference than one in which the agency avers
that it must approve the activity simply because it cannot forbid it. Thus, environmentalists may gain
greater protection of the resources they value, but developers in return will get greater certainty that
decisions favorable to them will not be overturned.
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This provides an element of fairness. In essence, the exceptional beauty, wildlife
use, or ecological importance of the lands would put the developer on notice
that these values might need to be preserved.
114
VI. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
115
Unfortunately for those seeking simplicity, the prohibition has not been limited
to forbidding the government from outright acquisitions of land or personal
property without paying for it.116  The Fifth Amendment has, rightly or
wrongly, been interpreted as requiring compensation in two additional situations.
In the first, to "take" encompasses physical occupation of land, a situation that
relates to the initial thrust of the provision. 117 Additionally, in some circum-
stances, less than either physical entry or acquisition of title might trigger the
just compensation requirement: a regulation may too greatly impede private
rights to be allowable. 118  This second situation fuels the "regulatory takings"
issue. The central query in regulatory takings analysis is whether the particular
landowner should receive compensation because of an interference with property
use. 119 A more precise rendition of the problem would be, "Has this landowner
114 . Cf Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L REV. 1411, 1430
(1993) (analogizing for takings purposes to the Fourth Amendment cases that find the physical char-
acter of land influences privacy expectations).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall be ... deprived of... property without due
process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law"). "Due process," of course, provides limits on actions in
regard to property in addition to the prohibition against taking without compensation. Some of the
following arguments were originally developed in Maria E. Mansfield, Regulatory Takings Expectations
and Valid Existing Rightis 5 J. MIN. L & PoL'Y 431 (1989-90).
116. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 n.25 (1978)
(taking not limited to physical transfers of property). See also id. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
For advocates of similar propositions, see Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1114-15 (1993)
(taking occurs "when some productive attribute or capacity of private property is exploited for state-
dictated service"); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1697, 1702-05 (1988) (compensate only for improvements government will use).
117. Because destruction equates easily with physical appropriation of land, compensation for
destroyed property was a natural next step. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) 166 (1871).
Permanent entry on someone's land, either by the government itself or the public, under current rules
may also require compensation even if the intrusion is de minimis. See eg., Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); but see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
82-84 (1980) (entry into shopping center literal but not constitutional taking). See also Thomas W.
Merrill, Trespas Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 28-29, 44
(1985) ("mechanical" permanent physical occupation test similar to formal eminent domain, reflects
low transaction costs, and resembles "dimensional" test for trespass and nuisance distinction).
118 . See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); but see Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) where the Court stated that "[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property
for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of
the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the
public benefit." Id at 668-69. These potentially inconsistent positions thread through takings juris-
prudence. They are not, however, necessarily inconsistent. See generaly Mansfield, supra note 115.
119. An unanimous Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit
interference with property rights, but conditions the interference on providing compensation. Pre-
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been disproportionately burdened?"
120
Neither traditional glosses to this question, nor modern refinements provide
rigid rules. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,121 Justice Scalia1 22 at-
tempts, but fails, to provide a more definitive analytical structure. Rigidity, how-
ever, should not necessarily be a goal. "Just compensation" requirements should
respond to the "expectations" that currently govern property rights or the proc-
ess would not be "just." There may be a constitutional core to the term
"property," but no rights are frozen. Protection of both property rights and
other rights align with societal needs and understandings through a process of
evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary, change. 123 The law before Lucas rec-
ognized this and also allowed distinctions between parties by defining the
"property affected" by a regulation in broad terms, which could include all prop-
erty the complaining party controls. 124 In this manner, risk-spreading was ac-
knowledged and disproportionate harm avoided while not overtaxing the public's
ability to compensate.
In order to assess how Lucas fits into prior case law and to what extent it
modified it, the case will first be explicated. After a historical review, it is found
that prior law recognizing risk-spreading and the evolutionary nature of property
rights has not been eviscerated, although Lucas does attempt to curb legislative
initiative in land use regulation.
A. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Scalia's Holding
Justice Scalia in Lucas categorizes potential takings situations into three
groups. One category will always be a taking, namely when there is a permanent
physical occupation of the relevant private property. 125  The remaining two
situations involve regulations that diminish the value of property. If the dimi-
nution is less than total, a court must consider "[tihe economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and ... the extent to which the regulation has inter-
seault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (no taking if Tucker Act available for com-
pensation). Although unanimous on this point, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy provided a
concurring opinion. See infra note 182.
120. See generally Michelman, supra note 90; John Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A
Decisional Modelfor the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983).
121 . 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
122 . Justice Scalia's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White,
O'Connor, and Thomas. Justice Kennedy concurred in the result. Justices Blackmun and Stevens
dissented, and Justice Souter provided a separate "statement," declaring certiorari to have been im-
providently granted.
123 . In PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 92-94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring), the Court stated "[ilndeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law
as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances." 14 at 92-93
(quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877)). State law may provide some definitions of prop-
erty, but it, too, is not static.
124. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-502 (1987).
125 . Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
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fered with distinct investment-backed expectations." 126 If, however, the diminu-
tion of value is total, denying the owner "all economically feasible use" of the
property,127 there will be a taking unless the regulated activity would meet the
common law definition of nuisance. 128  In the latter situation, the property
owner would never have had the right to proceed in such a fashion; nuisance law
constrains and defines the limits of property rights. Both the bases for and im-
plication of these statements need explanation.
The case arose out of the 1988 South Carolina Beachfront Management
Act. 129 The Act regulated coastal zones, including the Isle of Palms barrier is-
land, on which Lucas had purchased two residential lots in 1986.130 Owners of
pre-existing homes were subjected to various requirements, 131 but the impact at
issue was the prohibition of building permanent, inhabitable dwellings seaward
of a baseline, determined by connecting the points of erosion in the past forty
years. The Lucas lots were within this zone. The inability to build residences on
the lots, for the purpose of the case, rendered the lots "valueless."
132
In reviewing prior case law, Justice Scalia maintained that the ability to regu-
late land use and a commensurate impact on land values is an inevitable part of
a government's police power, and partially justified by the reciprocity of advan-
tage received from living in a community.133 Nevertheless, when a full depriva-
tion of value occurs, a landowner generally is required to keep land in its natural
state.134  Justifications for such deprivations in the past called upon the
"noxious or harmful use" rationale, which stated there could be no taking if the
regulation merely stopped a harmful use, rather than sought a public benefit.
126. Id. at 2895 n.8 (citing Penn Centrai 438 U.S. 104).
127 . Id. at 2894. Justice Scalia variously uses the phrases "denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of lands" and "denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Id. at 2893.
He only applies the rule to land, not to personal property. He distinguished personal property allow-
ing regulation to go further without compensation because of the "State's traditionally high degree of
control over commercial dealings." Id. at 2899.
128. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Supp. 1990).
130 . Lucas was one of the developers of the residential project. He repurchased the lots at
more than four times their initial sales price. Purportedly, one would be for his own residence and
one for resale after building a house. At the time Lucas acquired these parcels, he was not legally
obliged to obtain a permit in advance of any development activity.
131 . See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2924 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 . Id. at 2896 n.9. But see id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (delineating residual value of
lot for camping, picnicking, or use with a mobile home); id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133 . Id. at 2894. Justice Scalia also states that "'prevention of harmful use' was merely our
early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any
regulatory diminution of value." Id. at 2898-99. This statement does not mean the nuisance exception
has been rewritten to be co-extensive with the police power; Scalia also states that this formulation can
only justify the police power, not total deprivations without compensation. Id. at 2899. But see Jan
G. Laitos, The Public Use Pamdox and the Takings Clause, 13 J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL L 9,
14 (1993) (arguing that Lucas continues trend of authorizing any regulation if done for the public
use). 134 . The fact that land must be kept in a natural state may be the anathema Justice Scalia
seeks to avoid. He insists that prior cases in which no takings were found did not exclude all use of
property, but just excluded particular uses of property, such as livery stables, breweries, and brick
manufacturing. Id. at 2899.
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Justice Scalia accurately noted that such a determination may be two-sides of one
coin; any competent legislative drafter could easily couch almost any benefit de-
sired as a prevention of harm.135 Therefore, Justice Scalia sought refuge in nui-
sance law.
Justice Scalia phrases the issue as whether, under the common law of a par-
ticular state, either a private party could stop the proposed use through a private
nuisance action or a public entity could enjoin the activity as a public nuisance.
If either theory would prevail, the regulatory restriction would "inhere in the
title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." 136 As Justice Scalia
notes, a statute or regulation forbidding the same would be duplicative. 137
To determine if a nuisance exists, Justice Scalia demands judicial action. A
court should balance the factors listed in the Restatement of Torts. 138 Justice
Scalia, however, does intimate that common land uses would infrequently be
"nuisances:"
The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated
owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition (though
changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so), see Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 827,
comment g. So also does the fact that other landowners, similarly situated,
are permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant.
1 39
To Justice Scalia, "[iut seems unlikely that common-law principles would have
prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on peti-
tioner's land." 140 He warned that legislative findings of harm and the public
interest would not be determinative; to forbid the activity without compensation
would require "South Carolina ... [to] identify background principles of nui-
135 . He noted that negative easements are obtainable by purchase. Id at 2895. Moreover:
One could say that imposing a servitude on Lucas's land is necessary in order to
prevent his use of it from "harming" South Carolina's ecological resources; or, in-
stead, in order to achieve the "benefits" of an ecological preserve. Whether one or
the other of the competing characterizations will come to one's lips in a particular
case depends primarily upon one's evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real
estate.
Id. at 2898 (citations omitted). See also id. at n.12 (harm/benefit test "amounts to a test of whether a
legislature has a stupid staff").
136 . Id. at 2900.
137. Id.
138 . According to Justice Scalia, the determination would require:
analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or
adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities, see, e.g., Re-
statement (Second) of Torts §§ 826, 827, the social value of the claimant's activities
and their suitability to the locality in question, see, e.g., id., §§ 828(a) and (b), 831,
and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures
taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike, see,
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sance and property law that prohibit the uses ... [Lucas] now intends in the
circumstances in which the property is presently found." 141  On remand, the
South Carolina court found no nuisance. 14
2
B. Pr-Lucas Law
Most commentators, and even Justice Scalia, 143 date the first recognition of
regulatory takings to the famous pronouncement by Justice Holmes in Pennsylva-
nia Coal Co. v. Mahon:
144
One fact for consideration in determining such limits [of proper police
power impingement] is the extent of diminution. When it reaches a cer-
tain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of emi-
nent domain and compensation to sustain the act . . . . The general rule
... is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
145
This holding seemed to make compensable takings partially a matter of degree;
regulation under the police power sometimes would require compensation if too
great a diminution of value resulted. 146 Holmes' statement recognized, however,
that compensation is not required whenever value is destroyed, but would be
necessary in "most" such cases. 147  Nevertheless, non-compensable regulatory
actions could greatly lessen property value.
148
141 . Id. at 2901-02. This holding was characterized as dramatically changing the burden of
proof. Id. at 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142 . 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992).
143. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2892-93. See also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d
893, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Mahon breaks with precedent finding a regulation can never be a taking.).
But see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L REV.
1892, 1900-09 (1992) (citing earlier cases requiring compensation without physical occupation); Wil-
liam W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1394 (1993) (labeling Justice Scalia's
embrace of the "new" Mahon rule as a retreat from original intent analysis).
144. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
145 . Id. at 413-15. Some of the following arguments were originally developed in Mansfield,
supra note 115.
146 . Justice Holmes invalidated a statute that required coal to remain underground to prevent
subsidence of residences and other improvements. The statute would have precluded mining even if
the owner of the severed mineral had waivers of the right to subjacent support unless, under a com-
panion law, the coal company contributed two percent of market value of mined coal to a fund that
paid damages for subsidence. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Search For Seizure: Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon in Context, 4 LAw & HiST. REV. 1, 18-22 (1986) (suggesting Holmes thought general tax more
appropriate).
147. Compare the discussion of Lucas, infra part VII-A, with other recent proponents of Hol-
mes' approach, who also except from censure regulations that either prevent discrete noxious activities
or grant reciprocal benefits, for example, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 511-13 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 144-49 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
148 . In fact, from 1923 until 1987, the Supreme Court never struck down a regulation as a
taking if it did not comprise a physical entry. See Jan G. Laitos, Regulation of Natural Resources Use and
Development in Light of the "New" Takings Clause, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, 1-29 (1988). Hol-
mes elsewhere approved legislation that interfered with either mineral recovery or contracts. See. eg.,
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Courts have employed various methods to discern the dividing line between
requiring and not requiring compensation for a taking. One distinction may be
the strength of the public purpose being forwarded. In Mahon, the majority's
basic concern was that "the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient
to warrant so extensive a destruction of ... constitutionally protected [private]
rights." 149 Despite the presence of "diminution in value" that could arguably be
"too much," compensation historically was not required in three strong public
interest situations: when the prohibited action resembles a nuisance, 150 when it
would injure core values, 15 1 and when it would destroy gains from reciprocal
restrictions.
152
The nature and purposes of the government action create distinctions be-
tween types of regulations. 153 The closer a regulation comes to protecting core
communal values, the more likely it is to be upheld. If the action to be curbed
is allowed to continue, it almost becomes a theft of those values. 154 Alterna-
tively, economic sensibility justifies and even demands regulation under the reci-
procity analysis.
155
Modern case law adds a key refinement. Private property has always been
subject to the law of the land. Therefore, a landowner's reasonable expectations
about the use of his or her land must recognize this. By the late 1970's, the tak-
Erie R.R. Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135
(1921); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S.
104 (1911); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908).
149. 260 U.S. at 414. Compare Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (Holmes apparently viewed it as a dis-
pute between the Mahon family and the coal company) with id. at 421-22 (Brandeis envisioned an
entire city disappearing into a yawning hole). See also Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the
Takings Clause. The Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL L. 3, 10-16 (1987) (explicating background of
justices' views).
150 . Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
151 . See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
152. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
153 . These three approaches require more than simply balancing society's gain with the harm
to the individual to validate a regulation that destroys property value without compensation. The
lower balancing threshold ultimately only validates the exercise of the police power; a regulation that
created more harm than good could not "advance" any public purpose.
154 . Michelman, supra note 90, at 1236-37; cf. Sax, supra note 83, at 188 (public trust prevents
"destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition such
as title").
155 . Land use regulation can create value for the whole that exceeds individual parcel valua-
tions, even if each individual landowner could develop in any way desired. A focus on overall in-
creased benefits eliminates the need to identify a "nuisance" or overriding social concern. It recog-
nizes, as both Justices Holmes and Brandeis did, that there may, in civilized society, be a "reciprocity
of advantage" in regulation. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). But see id. at
422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (no reciprocity of advantage is needed if-preventing harm). See also Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 143-47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (compensation unnecessary "under a comprehen-
sive land use plan, [which] benefited as well as burdened for average reciprocity"). Although
Rehnquist found no reciprocity in Mahon, Justice Brennan did. From Brennan's description of the
Landmark Preservation Law's purpose, one wonders how a railroad company, which gains from travel,
could ever have objected. Id. at 109. In essence, if reciprocity exists, it provides compensation, and
therefore violation of the constitutional command is avoided. See Donald Wittman, Liabiliy for
Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 75-76 (1984) (all landowners gain from New
Orleans' French Quarter being a historic district even if individual might net more if singly allowed
to violate norms).
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ings test more openly balanced several factors in the "too far" equation when
income-producing property was at issue. The test encompassed the character of
the governmental action, the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,
and the interference, if any, with investment-backed expectations. 156 This multi-
factored balancing test is more appropriate than relying only on voluntary sales,
or its equivalent, namely, automatic compensation, since a regulation impacts
many owners in different ways. Using voluntary sales to reach regulatory objec-
tives would entail high transaction costs in these situations.
157
The first factor of the test looks at the character of the governmental action.
This element may include aspects of the harm and detriment calculus as well as
the public use test, but the crucial question is how important the proposed po-
lice power exercise is to the public welfare.15 8 Some exigencies, such as national
security, can override private concerns completely.159 However, most goals are
not all-consuming, but require closer analysis to balance the strength of the po-
lice power assertion with the remaining two elements.
160
The second element considers how great a diminution in value need be
borne without compensation. The rote response is that government activity may
diminish a property's value, but not demolish it. This maxim is deceptively sim-
ple. Confusion abounds when courts attempt to delineate what exactly is the
affected property.
161
The final element of the three-part balance moves the analysis away from the
challenged regulation and is more helpful in initially determining whether a
taking exists. It examines, not the government's current action, but the law and
general atmosphere that colored the rights of the private party before the ques-
tioned regulation. If the complaining party had no reasonable expectation of
benefiting from the newly prohibited action, the regulation could not be a tak-
ing.162  To some extent, this conclusion parallels the rationale that no person
156. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. See generally David A. Myers, Some Observations on the Analy-
sis of Regulatoty Takings in the Rehnquist Court, 23 VAL U. L. REV. 527, 528-37 (1989). Two cases pro-
vided variants: Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) emphasized a two-prong analysis:
due process and economic impact; and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962),
emphasized a due process analysis.
157 . Merrill, supra note 117, at 43.
158 . Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133 n.30. See also Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of
Private Property, 58 WASH. L REv. 481, 483 (1983) (arguing takings law jurisprudence requires person to
continue to confer benefit on neighbors); Costonis, supra note 120, at 480 n.65 (broadening the con-
cept of harm to "fundamentally change the harm/benefit test's content").
159 . United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952) (security and imminent peril justify
uncompensated destruction of oil terminal); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155
(1958) (gold mines closed during wartime). These cases may be remnants of King's "emergency"
prerogatives, rather than exceptions to compensation under eminent domain. Stoebuck, supra note 91,
at 1067; cf First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 326
(1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (government may restrict access to hazardous areas).
160. Costonis, supra note 120, at 499-501 (vary government's burden of proof and level of
scrutiny because "[nlot all police power values are equal").
161 . See infra text accompanying notes 243-70.
162. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991) (claimant purchased wetlands knowing
of developmental restraints); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006 (1984) (information
given to EPA with no expectation of privacy).
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can retain a nuisance. Because the law never entitled one to continue a nuisance,
the activity could be outlawed without liability. It also resembles another
method courts use to find no taking. They declare the element of value that was
interfered with to have never been a part of the private estate in the first
place.
163
Another line of cases underscores the central position of expectations in
takings analysis. Courts declare many interests non-property for purposes of
"takings," but recognize them as property for due process protection. Hence,
notice and a hearing may be necessary before changes can affect them, but these
interests command no compensation if discontinued or modified. Contrarily, in
light of the importance of "investment backed expectations" in takings analysis,
they are dismissed as "mere expectancies," rather than property. 164  Therefore,
investment as opposed to expectation may be the primary focus of Fifth
Amendment analysis, 165 at least when homes or other property imbued with
personal emotion are not at issue.
166
Before the decision in Lucas, the last noteworthy year for the Supreme Court
and the question of regulatory takings was 1987.167 In most respects, the court
did not alter prior law extensively.168 The importance of the police power objec-
tive remained a distinguishing characteristic between compensable and non-
compensable regulation. 169 For example, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
163 . This technique applies to land riparian to navigable water. All navigable waters are sub-
ject to an interest known as the "navigation servitude," under which the United States has jurisdiction
to control water use for power and navigational purposes. If the United States exercises these powers,
no objection can be lodged. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956) (just compen-
sation for condemned riparian lands did not include value of location near navigable river). There
might, however, be limits to the reach of the navigation servitude. Frank I. Michelman, Property as a
Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L REv. 1097, 1106-08 (1981) (Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979), protects fundamental right to exclude); see also Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach, 835 P.2d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (no taking if public trust doctrine forbids the activity the
private claimant proposed); Fred R. Disheroon, After Lucas: No More Wetlands Takings?, 17 VT. L REV.
683 (1993) (arguing property rights in water and hence wetlands limited).
164 . See, e.&, Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (method of computing welfare benefits);
Allied-General Nuclear Services v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (license); Burglin v.
Morton, 527 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1975) (pending lease applications); Opinion of the Justices, 151
N.E.2d 475 (Mass. 1958) (dower and curtesy); see also Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369, 1379-85 (1993) (discussing the
meaning of "expectations" in private law).
165 . See Ciampetti, 22 Cl. Ct. at 321 (discounting impact on claimant because he had not truly
assigned any value to the wetlands up on their acquisition with other property, the government is not
to be the "involuntary guarantor of [claimant's] gamble"); see also Stephen J. Massey, justice Rehnquist's
Theory of Property, 93 YALE L.J. 541, 555-60 (1984) (traditional rights stabilize control of productive
resources and promote efficiency).
166. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (finding no investment-backed expectation in
being able to devise property, but protecting right); see also St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New
York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (restriction a taking if it would prevent or seriously inter-
fere with carrying out of charitable purpose).
167. See e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
168 . For a fuller discussion, see Mansfield, supra note 115.
169 . Available remedies changed. Prior to First English, if a regulation was a taking, an injured
party could only invalidate the offending law. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,
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sion,170 although the private parties prevailed, the case did not impact govern-
mental regulation as greatly as it might initially appear. The California Coastal
Commission required that the Nollans provide public access across the beach on
their property as a condition for a building permit. The Court second-guessed
governmental intent and the means chosen to achieve its ends; to uphold the
regulation, a clear nexus between the evil to be avoided and the land use restraint
imposed was required. No such nexus was found.171 This "nexus" requirement
could signal tighter control of regulatory power, but for the fact that the agency
actually sought to acquire an easement for public use across residential property.
This aligns the case with circumstances that previously commanded solicitude for
private interests. 172 The case did not necessarily indicate a new regime of en-
hanced scrutiny for all regulatory actions.
A second takings case of the 1986 term indicated that a delicate balancing of
interests continued to be necessary. The circumstances of Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. Benedictus173 are closely analogous to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-
hon.174  Both cases appraised Pennsylvania statutes that required coal remain
underground to prevent subsidence of private residences. Both involved com-
plaints from owners of severed mineral estates objecting to the surface protec-
tion.175  The holdings, however, were anything but identical: the 1987 Court
found no taking where the 1922 Court found a regulation that went "too far"
because it totally destroyed the property's viable use. Nevertheless, the second
case did not overrule the first. It distinguished the cases on two major counts.
First, to the majority, the second statute's public purpose was clearer.
176
The dissent details the similarities between the two statutes and is correct in cate-
gorizing any literal distinction as flawed. 177 But to come to that conclusion is
not to fault the majority's result. Societal perceptions about the purpose and
nature of the problems addressed are more important than the literal wording of
450 U.S. 621, 640-42 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The landowner received no compensation for
the time during which the unconstitutional law demanded compliance. First English allowed damages
for a 'temporary" taking, measured by the time the law was presumptively valid and "worked a taking
of all use of property." First English, 482 U.S. at 321. On remand, the California court found no
taking occurred because the building restriction was passed to prevent injury and death. First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 C Rptr. 893, 904 (1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1056 (1990).
170. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
171 . Id. at 837-39.
172 . For further discussion of this case, see Mansfield, supra note 115, at 451-52 (facts of case
were close to allowing physical occupation of land, involved requirements for land dedication, and
affected a residence).
173. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
174. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
175 . Compare Mahon, 260 U.S. at 393-96 with Keystone, 480 U.S. at 475-79. For general infor-
mation on relationships between mineral and surface owners, see Mansfield, supra note 13, at 66-78.
176 . Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492 (prevents actions similar to public nuisance). See Rose, supra
note 74, at 580 (rejects arguments for broad public purpose and characterizes the law as redistributive);
Rubenfeld, supra note 116, at 1113 (statute put coal to affirmative use as support).
177. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 509-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the statute. 178 By 1987, there was more of a consensus that government may act
to protect the environment, including protection of the public from the exter-
nalities of activities such as mining.
The second revision to the calculus was what property the regulation af-
fected. 179 Holmes narrowly viewed the impacted interest to be the right to mine
coal without liability; what was taken was the coal company's distinct negative
easement in the surface. 180  The modern court acknowledged that a severed
mineral estate existed but refused to segment the coal estate into individual ton-
nage, It asked whether the regulation left the mineral producing property un-
economical "as a whole." 181  The property "as a whole" was the coal owned by
the complaining companies.
A comparison of the two cases in which land use controls were at issue un-
derscores the importance of the police power objective. Nollan, unlike Keystone,
dealt with a discrete easement that could efficiently be purchased. 182 Keystone,
conversely, dealt with both diffuse harm and diffuse benefits. 183 In addition to
confirming that strength of purpose can validate regulation without compensa-
tion, the Court's treatment of the "too much" equation looked at broad own-
ership patterns. This spreads the cost of protection from such harm and mili-
tates against costly compensation.
C. A Critique of Lucas
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, does not turn takings jurisprudence
on its head in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.184 In addition to recogniz-
ing the continued viability of the nuisance exception, he acknowledges that other
questions remain to be argued. First, in footnote seven, he reiterates that he
would deem any regulated property to be a discrete parcel rather than a portion
of a party's larger holding, but he recognizes that the definition of the property
178 . In the sixty-five year interim, environmental issues have changed the context of the strug-
gle to Brandeis's vision rather than that of Holmes: the problem is not simply that of one private
residence versus one private coal mine. Compare Mabon, 260 U.S. at 413 with id. at 421-22 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
179. For a general discussion of techniques, see infra text accompanying notes 243-70.
180. Costonis, supra note 120, at 536 n.291 (case found statute physically invaded property be-
cause it extinguished a negative easement; true regulatory takings cases involve mere impingement on
landowner's fee interest).
181 . 480 U.S. at 496 ("We do know, however, that petitioners have never claimed that their
mining operations, or even any specific mines, have been unprofitable since the Subsidence Act was
passed. Nor is there evidence that mining in any specific location ... has been unprofitable.").
182 . A strong concurrence in Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990)
emphasized that appropriation of a public easement would be a taking and require compensation. See
also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
183 . See generaly Sax, supra note 91, at 155 (creating a necessity to protect "public rights");
Merrill, supra note 117 (further increasing transaction costs of voluntary acquisition).
184 . See, eg., critical reviews by parties of contrasting views, Epstein, supra note 164 (arguing
Justice Scalia failed to clarify law), and Sax, supra note 73, at 1437 (arguing Justice Scalia wants to
affirm importance of property but cannot find standard to control government excess without un-
dermining all regulation).
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affected by a regulation could be contentious. 185 Second, in footnote 8, he re-
acknowledges the importance of property owner expectations when regulation
results in less than complete loss of economic value. 186 Despite this continuity
with prior law, in his analysis of nuisance, however, Justice Scalia misses some
subtleties and he incorrectly denigrates the role of the legislature.
First, Justice Scalia faults the "noxious use" test and embraces the "nuisance"
test, but fails to recognize the interrelationship between the two methods of as-
certaining when compensation need not be paid; the tests are different labels for
the same analytical framework. Traditional nuisance law encompasses the idea
that some uses in context are "noxious" and, therefore, nuisance limits private
property rights. 187  Nuisance law provides a perimeter for constitutional safe-
guards. Justice Scalia correctly notes that a regulation forbidding a nuisance
simply implements legislatively what a court could order by equitable injunction.
No compensation would therefore be due. In simple situations, the distinction
between appropriating, such as obtaining sites for highways or post offices, and
regulating activities that unreasonably impinge on neighboring land may give
predictable and non-objectionable results.
188
The strengths and weaknesses of the technique, however, become apparent
when a time-honored case embodying this principle is examined. Mugler v. Kan-
sas involved a brewery building rendered useless when the state outlawed liquor
manufacture and sale. Justice Harlan's opinion upheld the statute because pre-
vention of a "noxious use" is inherently different from a regulation that prohib-
its an "innocent" use in order to obtain a public benefit. 189 Justice Holmes also
found the "noxious use" principle self-evident. 190 Regulations that purportedly
only prevent detriment and ones that seek gains for the public historically justi-
fied different impacts on private property.
Naturally, morality and community norms influence what is labeled "noxi-
ous" or detrimental. 19 1  Standards change through time as does legislation re-
185 . Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7.
186 . Id. at 2895 n.8.
187. No person may unreasonably use property to the detriment of neighbors: "all property in
this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to
the community." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).
188 . See Sax, supra note 91, at 154-55; see also Patrick Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means:
Understanding Takings Jurisprudence in a Legal System with Integrity, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 433, 459 (1989)
(arguing the nuisance principle is essentially sound).
189 . Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
190 . Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384, 386 (1930) (Holmes, J.)
("when a business is extinguished as noxious under the Constitution the owners cannot demand com-
pensation from the Government").
191 . See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak nor
Obtuse, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1630, 1638 (1988) (nuisance law follows community norms to be neutral
benchmark between benefit and harm); Donald C. Dowling Jr., General Propositions and Concrete Cases:
The Search for a Standard in the Conflict Between Individual Property Rights and the Social Interest, 1 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL L 353, 367 (1985) ("a charting of the history of the police power parallels a history of
general social attitudes").
[Vol. 65
1994] WHEN "PUBLIC" RIGHTS MEET "PRIVATE" RIGHTS 223
flecting them; breweries exist again.192 Although flexibility through time might
not be a fault but a strength of the test, the distinction between obtaining a
benefit and controlling harm presents other difficulties.
193
As Justice Scalia correctly notes, the line between the two types of actions
sometimes defies clear analysis. 194 Benefit and harm may be a matter of per-
spective. A stable is not an "evil" occupation but a stable in a residential area
damages the health and comfort of residents. 195  To retell the example made
famous by Coase, a rancher earns a livelihood from cattle. Roaming cattle would
not cause damage if a neighbor did not plant corn. The removal of the "detr-
iment," namely roaming livestock, benefits the farmer. In a post-Coasean world,
it is often impossible to straightforwardly declare which of two activities, farming
or ranching, is necessarily the nuisance. 196 However, Justice Scalia's rejection of
the "harm/benefit" calculus may be more a desire to reject the concept that a
legislature may declare any and all development "harmful" because it would dis-
turb ecological integrity, than a failure to understand the interconnection be-
tween the two tests.
197
After rejecting the "harm/benefit" test and adopting the nuisance test, how-
ever, Justice Scalia in Lucas also de-emphasizes the inherent flexibility of nuisance
law by concentrating on existing case law to define property rights. Nuisance law
looks beyond "background" property rights to current, on the ground concerns.
It encompasses certain principles, including an interrelationship between legisla-
tive pronouncements and the concept of a "nuisance."
198
192 . Courts, as well as legislatures, according to Justice Holmes, must respect the deliberate
pace of this flux:
[Tihe extent to which legislation may modify and restrict the uses of property consis-
tently with the Constitution is not a question for pure abstract theory alone. Tradi-
tion and the habits of the community count for more than logic.... The plaintiff
must wait until there is a change of practice or at least an established consensus of
civilized opinion before it can expect this court to overthrow the rules that the law-
makers and the court of his own State uphold.
Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & County of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 366 (1910) (upholds ordinance
outlawing burial in city to cemetery despite alleged $2 million expenditure); see also Jackman v. Rosen-
baum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) ("If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.").
193 . See generally Rose-Ackerman, supra note 116, at 1707-10. But see Allison Dunham, A Legal
and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L REV. 650, 664-65 (1958) (workable test).
194 . Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898.
195 . Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (health and comfort of community
justified exclusion of lawful stable from area); see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ex-
isting brickyard prohibited as health hazard despite precipitous drop in value of land).
196. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 6-8 (1960) (demonstrating
that without transaction costs, markets would foster efficient land use regardless of fault labels). See
also Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit., 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (1984). In-
deed, Professor Michelman referred to the fault rationale as being "itself an attractive nuisance."
Michelman, supra note 90, at 1199 n.72.
197. See Sax, supra note 73, at 1441.42.
198. See John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 14-15 (1993) (arguing law of public nuisance always recognized the police power of the
state and did not balance as in traditional private nuisance).
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A judge deciding if an activity is a nuisance would look to legislative balanc-
ing of rights. To refuse to consider the legislative action would be to ignore ma-
joritarian views of what is "reasonable" use of property. Although a court must
seek to protect the individual from the majority, if the goal is an "objective" view
of what is reasonable in regard to land use, the judge cannot fail to consider leg-
islative findings. It is, of course, quite possible that factions have influenced the
legislative process. If legislation truly targets an individual property rather than
a wide-ranging problem, then the courts must come to the aid of the individual
disproportionately burdened. 199  Therefore, while the legislative findings need
not be conclusive, legislation must, as Justices Stevens,200 Blackmun,20 1 and
Kennedy 20 2 acknowledge, assist the common law and its growth.
20 3
In an additional contraction of nuisance doctrine's flexibility, Justice Scalia
notes that if the use had been allowed in the past or is allowed to be done by
others, it would less likely be a nuisance. He does acknowledge that this ten-
dency is a less than iron-clad rule, but this denigrates strong precedent. It is
clear that merely because an action was not prohibited in the past does not fore-
close future control: "The submission that ... a 'taking' [is established] simply
by [a] showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property inter-
est that they heretofore had believed was available for development is quite sim-
ply untenable."20 4 Justice Holmes provided a similar caution: "Such words as
'right' are a constant solicitation to fallacy."205  New interpretations of public
needs color and modify private actions.
199. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2923-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Saul Levmore, TakingA Torts, and Spe-
cial Interests, 77 VA. L REV. 1331, 1356-58 (1991). But see Rubenfeld, supra note 116, at 1138 (arguing
protection should come from equal protection guarantees, not takings analysis).
200. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2921-22 (Stevens J., dissenting).
201 . Id. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202 . Id. at 2903 (KennedyJ., concurring).
203 . The entanglement of legislation and determining whether a nuisance exists is further il-
lustrated by the fact that judges have been accused of using the guise of common law to legislate, that
is, to make general societal choices when they determine if a nuisance exists. Prah v. Maretti, 321
N.W.2d 182, 195 (Wis. 1982) (Callow, J., dissenting).
204 . Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. Justice Harlan's voice echoes: "[Although the brewery was
legal when built], the State did not thereby give any assurance, or come under an obligation, that its
legislation upon that subject would remain unchanged." Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669. See also Justice
McKenna:
A vested interest cannot be asserted against ... [exercise of the police power] because
of conditions once obtaining. To so hold would preclude development and fix a
city forever in its primitive conditions. There must be progress, and if in its march
private interests are in the way they must yield to the good of the community.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (citations omitted).
205 . Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (due process does not require a freezing of
common law property rights); Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 558 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting
that if change in liability equals a taking, "any new rule of state law requiring a tortfeasor to compen-
sate those he harms would constitute a taking"); accord Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud, 766 P.2d 1347, 1350
(Okla. 1986). See general Joseph L Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVT. L 473,
476-79 (1989) (delineating historical changes in the relationship between water needs and private prop-
erty rights).
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Finally, Justice Scalia downplays the contextual nature of nuisance law. He
seems to ask whether a house per se is a nuisance when he concludes that "[i]t
seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented the erection of
any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's land; they rarely sup-
port prohibition of the 'essential use' of land."20 6  The question, however, is
whether building in the particular location would create a nuisance by unrea-
sonably interfering with the rights of other property owners or the public. These
rights include preventing erosion and protecting property and human safety.
2 07
Justice Scalia at this point seems to forget the one definition of a nuisance that
most remember, namely the definition encapsulated in Justice Sutherland's fa-
mous aphorism: "A nuisance may be merely a right thing in a wrong place, like
a pig in a parlor instead of the barnyard."208 Justice Scalia does, however, leave
room for this acknowledgment when he notes that the South Carolina justifica-
tion for nuisance must look at the proposed use in view of "the circumstances in
which the property is presently found."209  Therefore, it is more the tone of
Justice Scalia's rhetoric than the actual doctrinal holding that lends itself to pro-
ponents of property rights.
VII. TAKINGS AND PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
Correctly viewed and applied, the nuisance exception can justify significant
regulation of private consumptive or exclusionary interests. When applied to the
public lands context, however, a threshold question exists: whose nuisance law is
to be examined for the background of property rights? The BLM or Park Service
should not be forced to manage lands differently in Utah and Colorado if the
state courts define property in subtly different ways. The federal common law of
nuisance, however, arose primarily not to determine the extent of federal regula-
tion, but to settle interstate disputes. 2 10 Nevertheless, there are some cases defin-
ing "nuisance" to determine the extent of the Property Clause.2 1 1 It is possible,
therefore, that a new federal common law of nuisance will emerge to judge the
potential for regulatory takings when rights to public lands, are involved. Courts
have in the past acknowledged that federal property interests cannot be confined
206. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2888. Professor Lazarus asks whether building a luxury home or
holding real estate for speculative gain are "essential" uses. See Lazarus, supra note 114, at 1424.
207. See Natasha Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Changing Tak-
ings Doctrine and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REv. 205, 212-213 (1991), cited with
approval in Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
208. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
209. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902.
210 . See e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
406 U.S. 91 (1972).
211 . Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) (referring to a fence on private property as
being a nuisance for public land management); United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487
F. Supp. 137, 143-44 (E.D. Va. 1979) (finding no federal power to regulate high rise construction that
would visually intrude on monumental core of Washington because buildings not nuisances). See
generaly John L Giesser, Comment, The National Park Service and External Development: Addressing Park
Boundary-Area Threats Through Public Nuisance, 20 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L REV. 761 (1993).
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by state property definitions.212  Or, perhaps more appropriately, a test other
than a nuisance-based one will be articulated. Because of the strength of the
Property Clause and the plenary power of Congress under it, to limit either
Congress or a land-managing agency to nuisance abatement may be unten-
able.
213
Therefore, the extent of the government's absolute right to prohibit activity
on the public lands under the nuisance exception to takings or under a special
analog of this test is not clear. Nevertheless, Lucas is important because it con-
tinues to recognize an additional regulatory takings test. This test examines the
nature of a party's expectation to conduct the prohibited activity if the diminu-
tion of value of the property was less than total. 2 14 This test, as well as the dif-
ficulty of determining the extent of the property regulated, will be examined
further as takings jurisprudence is applied to two hypothetical situations: a pro-
hibition of mining on an unpatented mining claim and a prohibition of grazing
on a grazing permit.
Grazing and mining are consumptive uses of the public lands. Although
these uses take place in other land management systems, this discussion will fo-
cus on the BLM's denial of a use and the resulting takings determination. There
are several reasons for this focus. First, the nature of a grazing permit under the
Taylor Grazing Act has been the subject of judicial and statutory clarification.
2 15
Secondly, the BLM's organic act does not directly forbid it from regulating an
unpatented mining claim to the point of saying "no" to mining. 216 In fact, if
the mining claim was located after the passage of FLPMA in 1976, the BLM may
have been directly granted authority to veto development.
217
The following hypotheticals posit a BLM decision preventing initial devel-
opment of an unpatented mining claim or ceasing to allow grazing on a particu-
lar allotment. To a large extent, the BLM's decisions are, and would continue to
212. See North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983) (state could not authorize inter-
ference with federal easements); United States v. Little Lake Misere Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (state law
does not define federal purchases for wildlife refuges).
213 . See Mansfield, supra note 48, at 496-97.
214. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
215 . Permits "shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands." 43 U.S.C.
§ 315b (1988). The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that there can be no compensation for
the value added to base property by the permit. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973). See 43
U.S.C. § 17 52 (g) (1988) for the ability to cancel a grazing permit.
216 . Cf. The Forest Service Organic Administration Act forbids action that would "prohibit
any person from entering upon such national forests for all proper and lawful purposes, includ-
ing ... prospecting, locating, and developing ... mineral resources ...." 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1982). The
Forest Service regulations reflect this. Miners have "a statutory right to enter upon the public lands
to search for minerals [but operations] shall be conducted so as to minimize adverse environmental
impacts on National Forest System surface resources." 36 C.F.R. § 228.1 (1993); see also Skaw v. United
States, 740 F.2d 932, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Forest Service may not prohibit or circumscribe use too
strictly); United States v. Weiss, 642 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1981) (Forest Service authorized to minimize
harm, not to interfere with mining).
217 Although FLPMA left much of prior law unaltered, mining operations were subjected to
section 302(b)'s general command to prevent "unnecessary or undue degradation." 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b)
(1988). For the argument that the BLM may have the authority to foreclose mining under this
authority, see Mansfield, supra note 13, at 79.
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be, insulated from substantive judicial review.2 18  Judicial deference to the
BLM's decisions is not necessarily an evil. This deference allows the BLM to
assess activities within the framework of its overall land management regime,
rather than limiting its focus to the particular parcel of public land on which
the activity will occur.2 19  Nevertheless, if courts defer totally to agency deci-
sions, there is no guarantee that professionalism or rationality will prevail.220
The basic review standard under the Administrative Procedures Act overturns
arbitrary or capricious actions.221 Without attempting to resolve the question of
appropriate levels of judicial review, a threshold for meaningful review requires
that this test should not insulate the agency from unexplained and unexplainable
choices.
222
Nevertheless, so long as it provides all interested parties with access to the
decision-making process, the agency, rather than the federal courts, is the appro-
priate body to make decisions about public land management. For purposes of
the next section of this analysis, presume that the decision to forego develop-
ment would meet a test of rational agency decision-making. To do so, the agency
must have considered all impacted resources and interests as well as alternative
methods to approach development. A dispassionate third party would agree
that, on the evidence presented, the gains from allowing the private activity
would not justify destroying other values. 223  Nevertheless, there is a second
question, namely whether the owner of the consumptive or exclusionary right
should be compensated for foregoing the right.
218. Mansfield, supra note 48, at 495.
219. Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1003 (D. Utah 1979). For an opposing view, compare
the criticism of judicial allocation of resources under public trust doctrine as "undemocratic."
George Gould, Public Trust Doctrine and Water Rights, 34 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L INST. 25-47 to 2549
(1988). For similar views see James L Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges A Comment on the
Public Trust Writings of Professors Sa, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 DENV. L.J. 565 (1986); James L.
Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and
Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L. 171, 208-10 (1987). But see Sax, supra note
83, at 192-93 (trust doctrine democratizes process); and the lively debate between Professors Huffman
and Blumm in Symposium, The Public Trust and the Waters of the American West: Yesterday, Today and
Tomorrow, 19 ENVTL L 425 (1989).
220 . Factions and special interest groups may prevail upon legislatures. This could result in
oppression, but due process analysis could protect those disproportionately singled out.
221 . 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
222. F. Kaid Benfield, The Administrative Record and The Range of Alternatives in National Forest
Planning. Applicable Standards and Inconsistent Approaches, 17 ENVTL. L. 371, 375 (1987) (arbitrary and
capricious standard favors federal agencies decisions but need at least minimal factual support and
reasonableness). There should be some middle ground between extreme deference to an agency and
total distrust of its actions. Compare Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 807 n.12 (9th Cir. 1979)
(agency action must be "irrational" with virtually no evidence to support agency's methodology) with
Hinsdale Livestock Co. v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 773, 777 (D. Mont. 1980) (court effectively
looked to ranchers as primary experts).
223. Cf. Zygmont J.B. Plater & William L Norine, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Do-
main: Exploring the '"rbitraty and Capricious" Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental
Decisions, 16 B.C. ENvTL AFM. L REv. 661, 666 (1989) (positing a workable test of arbitrariness to be
"whether a rational official could have reached challenged decision on the given facts").
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A. The Unpatented Mining Claim
A prohibition on mining would be a taking under Lucas in two circum-
stances.224  First, if it created a total diminution of the property's value and
mining was not a nuisance or, second, if the diminution was less than total and
the prohibition created an untoward interference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations. It is possible that a complete denial of development would
not be a taking. Three issues are crucial to such a conclusion: 1) how the prop-
erty impacted is defined, 2) what is reasonable to anticipate about the ability to
mine, and, of course, 3) whether mining could be considered a nuisance.
As a threshold issue, the nature of an unpatented claim must be determined.
An unpatented mining claim is a form of property.225  However, the only
"right" the mining claimant has is to mine: the claim may not be used for non-
mining purposes. 226  Therefore, the expectations about the ability to derive a
benefit from the claim will pivot on the right to mine.
In an analysis of whether a regulation effects a taking, what is "reasonable"
to anticipate about property is crucial. The key is the reasonableness of any in-
vestment-backed expectations the owner might have about development. In some
shorthands, too great an impingement on investment-backed expectations be-
comes the sine qua non of a taking.227 Nevertheless, expectation analysis might
not assist the mining claimant in asserting a right to compensation.
If a mine is not yet in operation, what the claimant anticipates is unrealized
profit, which is one of the least p'rotected aspects of property ownership:
Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation
that courts are not especially competent to perform. Further, perhaps be-
cause of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains has tradition-
ally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related interests.
22 8
224. This discussion assumes that the "nuisance" exception, however nuisance may be defined,
does apply to validate regulations of public lands use.
225 . Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 295 (1920) (finding an unpatented mining claimant's pos-
sessory title to be property "in the fullest sense"); United States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193, 195 (l0th
Cir. 1956). The mining claim is, however, a form of property that is defined by Congress. Freese v.
United States, 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
226 . 30 U.S.C. § 612(b) (1988); see United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277,
1280 (9th Cir. 1980).
227 . State v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 995, ioll (D. Utah 1979). One influential article on tak-
ings aptly summarized the interrelationship of the "diminution of value test" with expectations:
[Tihe test poses not nearly so loose a question of degree; it does not ask "how
much," but rather (like the physical-occupation test) it asks "whether or not":
whether or not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically de-
prived the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-
acked expectation.
Michelman, supra note 90, at 1233.
228. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 66. See also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791
F.2d 893, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted):
[B]y dispensing with the fair market value test in determining the occurrence of a
taking, it makes the case improperly one to recover for frustration of business expec-
tations. A taking is founded on the fact that Florida Rock is prevented from doing
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Public needs may justify regulation that interferes with private consumptive or
exclusionary aims even if the power to profit from property is "a right usually
incident to fortunately situated property."
229
Additionally, if the mine is not yet in operation, the status quo is non-
development. This means there may be strong public expectations, be they indi-
vidual or collective, that the values supporting these interests would continue to
exist.230  While it is not impossible to regulate existing uses without running
afoul of the takings clause, it is easier to regulate new uses.231  One reason for
this distinction is the importance of the investment end of the expectation test;
less would be invested for a new use.
232
More importantly, if profit is to come from mining, the regulatory climate
over such activity would determine whether a reasonable expectation of unfet-
tered development could exist to be interfered with.233 Mining has been regula-
ted extensively over the years.234 The peculiar status of an unpatented mining
a profitable business in the extraction and sale of its limestone. Yet frustration of
performance of even an existing contract is not a taking of contract rights, still less a
hope of future profitable contracts.
229 . Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921) (Holmes, J.):
But while it is unjust to pursue such profits from a national misfortune with sweep-
ing denunciations, the policy of restricting them has been embodied in taxation and
is accepted. It goes little farther than the restriction put upon the rights of the
owner of money by the more debatable usury laws.
See also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (tenant financial hardship may effect rent con-
trol); FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987) (regulation of charges for access to utility
poles); Sax, supm note 91, at 154-60 (protecting economic advantage neither consistent with early his-
tory of compensation principle or contemporaneous history of amendment). But see Stoebuck, supra
note 91, at 1075-77 (Sax fails to recognize the tyranny he describes is destruction of property).
230 . Knowledge of the mineral character of the land may have tempered these expectations
because it would have provided "notice" of the land's usefulness for this purpose. This is similar to
the notice given the developer about the land's ecological value. See discussion supra at note 114.
231 . Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
232. Cf Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County, 494 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1993) (finding no
taking by precluding new use of strip mine's pit, partially because initial investment was for coal-
mining, not running the new landfill).
233 . Compare the response to allegations that Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2022, 2113, 2114, 7901-7942 (1988), interfered with investment backed expectations:
The only "expectation" that Western Nuclear could have under the circumstances it
has alleged is that it expected it would not have to spend its own money to remediate
health and environmental hazards created by its production of uranium. Such an
expectation cannot be a reasonable commercial expectation.
Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 758 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990).
234 . Mining may no longer be a "bully" destroying surface values with no compunction.
Whether this characterization of the industry is correct or responsive to society's needs is immaterial:
it colors takings analysis. Cf Gregory S. Alexander, TakinA Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1752, 1753 (1988):
Takings doctrine is generated not by any abstract methodological or theoretical con-
cern, but by the pictures that judges have in their heads about the participants in the
public land-use planning arena, pictures about who is empowered, who is unempow-
ered and how those who enjoy a power monopoly have used the power to their stra-
tegic advantage.
The "bully" characterization has also changed relationships between mineral and surface owners
in many situations, either by judicial effort or legislation. See generally Mansfield, supra note 13.
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claim reflects this growth of regulation. In 1985 the unpatented mining claim,
traditionally deemed a form of property, was classified as a mere right to a
stream of income, thus testing regulation of such claims under the less demand-
ing standard used for economic matters.235 On the public lands, both the state
and federal government may regulate for environmental protection.236 Congress
may modify the requirements for and benefits of patenting up until the time a
party has fully complied with all that is necessary under the law to obtain a pat-
ent.
23 7
More generally, a developer's expectations must include the almost universal
need to regulate the mining industry for environmental protection. The recent
past shows increased regulation and, therefore, decreased expectation of freedom
to develop.238 Therefore, if minerals were acquired knowing that restraints were
imminent, the imposition of the restraints should not trigger compensation.
239
The United States should not pay for a regulation's effect on minerals acquired
by a purchaser who knew that they never could be produced.
The almost all-encompassing requirements of varied environmental laws
restrain the expectation of mineral development.240 Using law to define expec-
tations may at first glance appear to embrace an element of circularity, as Justice
Kennedy noted in Lucas,24 1 but in reality the analogy is more to a spiral; expec-
235 . United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 (1985). An unpatented mining claim may there-
fore be approaching the status of personal property, rather than real property. If this is so, as Justice
Scalia noted, personal property may be subjected to greater controls than real property. Lucas, 112 S.
Ct. at 2899.
236. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. 572, 588-89 (1987). One commen-
tator claimed this case changed mining from a preferred use to simply one among many, John D.
Leshy, Granite Rock and the States' Influence over Federal Land Use, 18 ENVTL L. 99, 125-26 (1988). The
change, however, came much earlier. See generally Mansfield, supra note 13. Mining has been a suspect
category unless oil shale was involved. See Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657 (1980) (oil shale
exception to "valuable mineral" requirement of mining law); Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus,
619 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1980) (oil shale exception to the National Environmental Policy Act). For
some reason, the courts seemed adamant that oil shale development would save the western world. See
generally James N. Barkeley & Lawrence V. Albert, A Survey of Case Law Interpreting "Valid Existing
Rights" Implications for Unpatented Mining Claims, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9-13 to 9-20 (1988)
(illustrating change in property status of unpatented mining claims).
237 . Freese v. United States, 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
238 . Although the current Supreme Court has been characterized as pro-development, cases
on mining did not enter this computation. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism
and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 345 n.5 (1989).
Similarly, despite the suspicion of statutes that target distinct property interests, Dormant Mineral
Interests Acts were upheld. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
239 . Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 320-21 (1991) (no taking when claimant pur-
chased knowing of wetland restrictions). The refusal to compensate if regulation was imminent when
the interest was acquired may be analogized to the situation where value is traceable to the improve-
ment for which the government is condemning property. This value is not included in the value of
the property "taken" when just compensation is computed. The United States need not buy at the
price "boomtown" homesites will command after its dam is built in the desert. United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943) ("[O]wners ought not to gain by speculating on probable increase in
value due to the Government's activities.").
240. Laitos, supra note 148, at 1-1 to 1-3; John McFerrin & Benita Y. Whitman, Valid Existing
Rights and the Constitution: 1983 Regulatory Changes, 87 W. VA. L REV. 647, 660 (1985) (broad expecta-
tions test would find no right to continue negative externalities).
241 . Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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tations and the law slowly grow and respond to each other. The recognition of
the interrelationship between the regulatory climate and expectations is impor-
tant if the diminution of value is less than total. It also is important if the
diminution is total and a court must ascertain whether the decision to stop min-
ing would prevent a nuisance.
Mining does create difficulties such as pollution and subsidence that resem-
ble the subject matter of traditional nuisance law.242 The balancing a court will
have to do in the analysis will resemble, but need not directly replicate, the
BLM's decision-making on whether to allow the mining. Naturally, whether
expectation analysis or nuisance definition is the proper analytical path requires
a delineation of the property impacted by the decision. This definitional exercise
may also assist in reaching a fair result.
Despite the general status of expectations about mining, when mining a
particular mining claim is totally denied, failure to compensate may challenge a
sense of fairness. The diminution of value and balancing tests have as their ful-
crum reasonable expectation, but they also have a quantitative side. This two-
sided inquiry allows compliance with some intuitive idea of fairness; if the af-
fected party either retains a thing of value or was forewarned that development
might not be unfettered, the burden of forwarding the public good is not overly
onerous. Concern with spreading the risks and costs of regulation is thus central
to Fifth Amendment analysis.
Two main techniques guide attempts to define the property impacted by
government action: conceptual severance, which considers each strand of prop-
erty rights individually,243 and physical unity, which rejects reifying "rights" and
clings to a literal earth-based definition. 244 Some decisions forcefully reject con-
ceptual severance and examine the property as a whole to see whether unaffected
portions retain any significant value.245 A taking would exist only if total loss
242. But see Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (limestone mining in
that particular locale not a nuisance).
243 . Radin, supra note 76, at 1674-78 (court in Loretto and Nollan began to adopt conceptual
severance). See also Frank Michelman, Takin 1987, 88 COLUM. L REV. 1600, 1601 (1988) (employing
term "entitlement chopping").
244 . See Michelman, supra note 243, at 1614-16 ("conceptual severance" regards property right
as estate affected rather than the "layman's thing," that is, "the conventionally demarcated land parcel
with its improvements containing Grand Central Terminal").
245 . Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130. ("'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abroga-
ted"), criticized by Kystone, 480 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Rehnquist's dissent shows some members of the court are ready to curb governmental regulation
by strictly looking at the particular interest interfered with; each stick in the bundle of property rights
would require separate analysis. Id. at 517-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704 (1987). This case, however, presented an unusual opportunity to engage in conceptual sever-
ance; the land already had undivided interests and the statute specifically aimed at the subdivisions.
Justice O'Connor did not view the property's usefulness to be land per se; each small undivided in-
terest individually was too greatly devalued. The statute disturbed a fundamental element of property:
the right to dispose thereof. Id. at 716. See also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing rent control statute's requirement that "hardship to a
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of use results from the regulation. A total loss of use would leave the property
with no "economically viable" 246 or "reasonable beneficial" use.247 The Lucas
case echoes these holdings, but does not necessarily define the property interest
to be tested because the regulation at issue in Lucas purportedly affected the en-
tire fee.
248
Nevertheless, results may differ by attaching the word "property" to differing
physical attributes of land.249 As Justice Stevens noted:
[D]evelopers and investors may market specialized estates to take advantage
of the Court's new rule. The smaller the estate, the more likely that a regu-
latory change will effect a total taking.... In short, the categorical rule
will likely have one of two effects: Either courts will alter the definition of
the "denominator" in the takings "fraction," rendering the Court's cate-
gorical rule meaningless, or investors will manipulate the relevant property
interests, giving the Court's rule sweeping effect.2
50
The "relevant property interest" when dealing with an unpatented mining claim
must simply be the ability to mine, which is the limit of statutorily delineated
rights. 251  Therefore, the viability of surface uses would not be an issue as it
might be in other regulatory actions affecting mining.252 The remaining tech-
nique, altering the denominator in the takings fraction and thus changing the
percentage of loss may be relevant.
The opportunity to define "property" arises because takings analysis re-
quires a case by case application of site specific questions. Simply precluding
some mineral recovery does not automatically trigger a taking.253  Further ex-
amination is needed. Generally, courts speak of impacts on the totality of the
tenant" be considered took the freedom of individual landlords to charge fair market rent to poor
tenants).
246. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
247. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
248. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2886 n.7. The Court also did not look beyond the two lots currently
owned by Lucas.
249. Compare Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Clark, 740 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1984)
(vacated) with Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986) (opinion on
rehearing), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987). Judge Seth's original opinion treated each blade of grass
eaten by a wild horse as separate "property taken." The Tenth Circuit examined en banc whether the
horses substantially diminished the private owner's real estate. See also Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp.
1113, 1122-23 (D. Nev. 1989) (taking occurs when horses would use substantially all well's water).
250 . Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251 . See supra note 226.
252. The Supreme Court has intimated that viable non-mining uses for land might preclude
compensation. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296 n.37
(1981); McFerrin & Whitman, supra note 240, at 655 (presence of alternative surface uses could pre-
clude takings under "no other use" reading). But see United States v. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d 1169,
1174-75 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991) (finding surface uses immaterial if severed min-
eral estate at issue).
253 . Compare with cases rejecting a taking simply from passage of a legislative mining prohi-
bition such as Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 294-96. See also United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1985) (assertion of regulatory authority alone a taking;
must prevent "economically viable use").
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regulated operation.254 The decision would not be unconstitutional merely be-
cause a regulation rendered a particular mineral unmineable. The Supreme
Court's Keystone opinion may have taken the analysis one level further, although
Justice Scalia denounced the practice in footnote seven of Lucas.
255
The first step in Keystone, however, is slightly less controversial: the Supreme
Court rejected extreme hairsplitting. Each ton of coal was not an individual
piece of property that the statute's mining ban could render valueless.256 Even
without governmental requirements, no mine plan, no matter how efficient, an-
ticipates recovery of all the resource. 257  If, however, the restriction so trans-
forms mine development that it cannot proceed profitably, then a taking could
result under classic diminution of value theory.
258
Looking at the particular impact of the regulation on the operation of a
complainant has some appeal, but it does allow for disparate treatment and may
be criticized as looking at the impact on the regulated party, rather than the
property.2 59  If two companies have adjacent holdings, a decision that forbids
mining identical tonnage could be a taking in one instance and require compen-
sation but not a taking for the second company if mining its larger deposit re-
mained profitable. 260 Various cases looking at the impact of development of
wetlands have similarly allowed for such distinctions.261 To ascertain how much
diminution of value flowed from a permit denial, these courts looked not merely
at the area that could not be developed, but also at the upland areas already de-
254. See; e.g., Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (requiring specific re-
view of development by non-prohibited methods and of whether remaining mineral could be mined
in order to ascertain if prohibition of mining method equals a taking).
255 . Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
256. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987) (two percent
of total coal which must remain in place is not "separate segment of property").
257 . Room and pillar mining generally requires mineral to remain in place. Surface pits are
designed to recover the most mineral and handle the least amount of overburden. Mineral at the
outer boundaries of the deposit therefore will not be recovered. See generally Phillip W. Lear, Multiple
Mineral Development Conflicts: An Armageddon in Simultaneous Mineral Operations?, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 79, 81-89 (1983). Longwall mining is an underground mining technique sometimes referred
to as a fully extractive technique, but the Supreme Court rejected its classification as "fully" extractive.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 475.
258 . Two exceptions could negate a taking. These two exceptions would be that remaining
surface uses were material or that the restriction was a part and parcel of the interest at the time of
creation.
259 . See eg., Epstein, supra note 76.
260 . Naturally, if surface use could also be considered, additional variables abound. Florida
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Mineral land in the mountains
or deserts may well be foreseen to have no future use except for production of minerals. This land
[near Miami, Florida] is different."), on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990). For the reverse situation, see
Iowa Mining Co., Inc. v. Monroe County, 494 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1993) (holding there was no taking
if the claimant was precluded from using a pit for a landfill if it could still stripmine).
261 . Wetland regulation may create another genre of property for which a party might not
reasonably anticipate unrestricted development rights. Crow-New Jersey 32 Ltd. v. Township of Clin-
ton, 718 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D.N.J. 1989). See generalo Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal
Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence Intergovernmental Tension, and a
Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L REv. 695, 754-60 (1989).
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veloped or available for development. 262 They recognized that "[f]actors such as
the degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the parcel
has been treated as a single unit ... and no doubt many others ... enter the
calculus."
263
To ascertain whether the statute involved in Keystone caused a taking, that
court took a further step, however, when it did not necessarily limit itself to im-
pact on individual mines. The court intimated that it may be proper to examine
all the coal the companies owned.264  Increasing the scope of the analysis to
minerals in other locales could again create disparate treatment, but would look
beyond the vagaries of one mineral deposit. The resulting difference in treat-
ment, however, need not be anathema.
To a certain extent, measuring "property" in this manner could promote
asset shuffling to exploit the government's liability for compensation. 265  If
holdings have not been rearranged purposefully, however, disparate treatment
might not be an evil but a valid mechanism for spreading costs.266 This is espe-
cially true if the "property" examined could be broadened beyond the particular
regulated mine-site. Multiple holdings assure that some return on investment
can be had even if some properties do not provide the profit desired.267 Again,
the wetland cases provide analogy; if real estate developers have received a return
262 . Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Ciampitti v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1017
(1982); O'Connor v. Corp of Engineers, 801 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ind. 1992); State v. Schindler, 604 So.
2d 565 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992). But see cases emphasizing that the 'property" impacted was the non-
developable wetlands: Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990); Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990).
263 . Ciampitti, 22 Cl. Ct. at 318. Another factor listed was 'the extent to which the protected
lands enhance the value of remaining lands." This is important for development, such as housing,
that may benefit from the amenity of open-space, but it is not necessarily relevant to a mining opera-
tion.
264 . Kystone, 480 U.S. at 496. Because the Court is commenting on the total lack of evi-
dence, no determination of what evidence would satisfy the Court is possible. Importantly, the Court
did not mention the possibility of non-mining uses of the property.
265 . But f Mahon, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting): "I would suppose no one would
contend that by selling his interest above 100 feet from the surface he could prevent the state from
limiting, by the police power, the height of structures in a city. And why should a sale of under-
ground rights bar the state's power?" See Patrick C. McGinley & Joshua Barrett, Pennsylvania Coal
Company v. Mahon Revisited: Is the Federal Surface Mining Act a Valid Exercise of the Police Power or an
Unconstitutional Taking?, 16 TuLSA L.J. 418, 437-39 (1981) (to give more rights to one who owns less
shows it is absurd to apply diminution of value to uses).
266 . Cf Rose-Ackerman, supra note 116, at 1702-05 (if you compensate when all wealth is
taken, an individual might receive compensation when a corporation would not).
267. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L Rubenfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Anaosis,
72 CAL LAW. REV. 569, 606-12 (1984) (compensate relatively large losses for those unable to insure
against such losses; large investors purchase numerous investments, all of which are risky, independent
of taking possibilities and collectively become self-insurance). Naturally, even with other resources,
uncompensated, regulation could make entrepreneurs more cautious and hinder capital formation.
But, the result could also foster improved mining methods by creating incentives to avoid the costs
imposed by uncompensated bans. Sax, supra note 91, at 177-86. See also William A. Fischel & Perry
Shapiro, A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for Takings, 9 INT'L REV. OF L & ECON. 115, 124
(1989) (must consider expected behavior of government as well as private decision makers).
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on their investment, a taking is less likely to be found. 268  A similar return-
sensitive approach was hinted at by another court: judge the value of a particu-
lar mining deposit by looking at the operation it is a part of through time.269
Past productive mining may foreclose a taking because the property as a whole
had value. The inability to mine some of the tract in the future may be only a
slight diminution in value.
270
An argument that would allow for compensation under takings analysis for
some mineral owners but not others may seem to not only denigrate independ-
ent entrepreneurial spirit, but to violate the fundamental notion that similarly
situated persons must be similarly treated. To compensate a small mineral com-
pany but not a large one might seem "unfair" from the viewpoint of the large
company. However, the two companies are not truly similarly situated; the im-
pact on the small company will be much more drastic. Hard facts do create hard
law.
Moreover, it may be argued that the public lands are imbued with a public
interest.271  In other words, when a party has rights that impact the public
lands, a mirror-image of Munn v. Illinois2 72 results. In that case, the Supreme
Court found that when private property is used for public purposes, there is a
limited grant to government sufficient to support regulation.273  Conversely,
when public lands are affected, all private rights may be limited by a public in-
terest claim because of a limit on the grant to the private party. If that is the
case, regulation of private interests that impact this public interest is justified
and, to avoid a takings claim, all that would be required is some "reasonable"
return on the party's investment.
274
B. Takings and Grazing Permits
The second hypothetical is that the BLM determines that grazing shall no
longer be allowed on a specific allotment in order to improve the ecosystem.
268. Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Ciampitti v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991).
269 . Cogar v. Faerber, 371 S.E.2d 321, 326 (W. Va. 1988) ("[I]t appears that, while the value of
the entire tract may be reduced somewhat by the denial of the permit, the Intervenor has, nevertheless
productively mined the tract for some thirteen years.").
270. Id. Another measure of the "property" regulated could also spread costs. Nature pro-
vides a unit: the mineral deposit itself. It its recovery becomes uneconomic, then a taking would
occur.
271 . Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). This view of takings compensation based
on Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) differs from the use of a "collective-protection
servitude," which has been described by the author and rejected as premature. Mansfield, supra note
13, at 96-97. Under the servitude theory, a private party's rights would not include the ability to act
in a manner that would interfere with important public land values; therefore an activity could be
precluded without any need to consider compensation under the Fifth Amendment. A Duquesne
analysis, however, recognizes that the public interest may limit a party's return from the use of private
property, but does not totally deny the right to a return on an investment.
272 . 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
273 . ,1 at 126.
274. Cf Duquesne, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
The allotment will remain in public ownership and no other development would
preclude grazing directly. If the BLM follows the appropriate procedures to can-
cel a permit,275 the easy answer to the takings question would be that the
rancher has absolutely no claim to compensation because the rancher had no
right or interest in property from the permit.276  Any "expectation analysis"
would have to include this knowledge of the law. Therefore, a court would not
be free to compensate the permittee.277 Nevertheless, on another level of expec-
tation analysis, or when considering the extent of property impacted, the grazing
permittee could have an equitable claim for compensation, with equitable mean-
ing within the dictates of fairness.
278
A grazing permittee has strong expectations about the continuing ability to
use federal lands in conjunction with base lands because of past practice. Fami-
lies have ranched the same land for generations. Other ranches have changed
hands and the value of the grazing permits did impact price of the base lands.
The current rancher would have "bought" this value from a previous private
seller, although not from the United States.
279
Conversely, the public interest is seeking a change from the status quo, the
stopping of a current use for the purpose of improving the range. Arguably, the
erosion and desertification that may attend overgrazing could be nuisance-like
and the prohibition justified on that ground. Nevertheless, it is easier to regu-
late new uses than to curb existing uses. 280 The expectation interest on the pub-
lic side is less strong than when the current status is being maintained. It is po-
tentially less demoralizing to see the range remain in its current condition than
to initially see it being changed.
Additionally, the impact of the cancellation may fall on an individual
ranching operation. An individual operator may have little ability to spread
risks. The rancher may therefore have a stronger equitable claim to compensa-
275. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (1988).
276 . United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973) (according to the Taylor Grazing Act, permits
"shall not create any right, title, or estate in or to the lands" and therefore cannot compensate for
value they add to base property).
277 . Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 116, at 1108-09 (discussing "economic viability test" and termi-
nation of government benefits).
278 . This would have to be a political settlement through legislation. As noted below, it may
be one of the only ways to end grazing on the public domain if that is the ecologically desired op-
tion. Another way would be to amend the Taylor Grazing Act regulations so that parties wishing to
put AUM's "in the bank" for wildlife or forage repair may do so through private purchases of grazing
permits. The current regulations require a party to "be engaged in the livestock business" to retain a
lease or permit. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1 (1992).
279 . United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 503-04 (Powell, J., dissenting) (buyer of fee lands con-
siders use of federal lands for "fair market value"). However, the Supreme Court, in a five to four
decision, found Congress had clearly stated that no private expectation could attach to use of the
lands. Id. at 494 (permits "shall not create any right, title, or estate in or to the lands" and therefore
cannot-compensate for value they add to base property).
280. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125-27. But see Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962) (upholding prohibition of excavating below ground water level despite fact it would force
existing sand and gravel business to close). See also Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Ber-
nardsville, 608 A.2d 1377 (N.J. 1992) (rejecting takings claim based on depth of mining restriction
that eliminated ninety percent of value).
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tion based on financial impact and expectations, but another factor may also
color the equities. A ranch is identified more intimately with the "personhood"
of the rancher than a mine is, at least for a mine other than a "mom and pop"
mining operation. 281  Property intimately connected with the creation of indi-
viduality rather than mere investment should require more deference from inter-
ference.
282
The difficulties encountered in trying to raise grazing fees may be a political
reflection of these emotional responses. The stories told and images held by the
public and decision-makers influence results.2 83  The movies and television
shows of our childhood have given the rancher and cowboy the mantle of hard-
working, individualistic hero. Therefore, despite any negative impact on the con-
tinued viability of the range resource from grazing, total uncompensated removal
of livestock from the range, while within constitutional prerogatives, may not be




The problems of public land management cry out for insightful new tech-
niques, especially in resolving conflicts between private consumptive or exclu-
sionary desires and those of the public's individual and collective needs. Some-
one must mediate the clashes, because to simply do nothing is in itself a decision
that one or the other values will be denigrated. If Congress has not made clear
allocative choices, the land managing agency must accept the burden of deciding.
At some future point in the development of our laws and thinking, public land
use may be weighted in favor of individual/public and collective/public uses.
This would evolve out of a growing acknowledgment of their importance to the
public as a whole. At that time, the world of Miller v. Schoene285 would be
reached.
281 . Margaret Radin, Property and Pensonhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) (employing ex-
ample of a lost wedding ring; if stolen from a jeweler, insurance proceeds will recompense but if
stolen from a "loving wearer" no amount of money could restore status quo).
282. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982) ("[An owner
suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's property.").
See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 116, at 1700-02 ("social" more protected than "legal"); William H.
Rodgers, Jr., Bringing People Back. Toward A Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10
ECOLOGY L.Q. 205, 207-08 (1982) (substantive due process limits legislative power for core "human"
property); Costonis, supra note 120, at 499-500 ("economic" interest less protected than "dominion"
interest); Rubenfeld, supra note 116, at 1102-04 (identifying tendency to find 'fundamental" property
rights and link same to fundamental right of privacy); but see Lorretto, 458 U.S. at 439 (fact property
held for rental irrelevant).
283 . Cf. Alexander, supra note 234, at 1753.
284 . Total permanent removal, however, may not be the best result ecologically. Ungulates,
such as cattle are, when properly managed, an integral part of a healthy range. See CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIEN 104-07 (1992).
285 . 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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In the Miller case, the Supreme Court upheld the uncompensated destruc-
tion of cedars that harbored a pest deadly to neighboring apple orchards.
2 86
The source of this power was specific: "it is obvious that there may be, and that
here there is, a preponderant public concern in the preservation of the one inter-
est over the other."287 Neither tree is noxious or detrimental to man per se;, they,
are simply incompatible with each other.288 Faced with this dilemma, the legis-
lature must choose:
It would have been none the less a choice if, instead of enacting the present
statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the ap-
ple orchards within its borders to go unchecked. When forced to such a
choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon
the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in
the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public. It will not
do to say that the case is merely one of a conflict of two private interests289
In the world of Miller v. Schoene, apples were crucial to the local economy. In
some instances, therefore, courts have accepted that legislative embodiments of
universal declarations of value are possible.290  The Miller v. Schoene rationale
goes beyond the "nuisance" or "noxious use" exception because it allows the
legislature to declare an overriding public interest to resolve private clashes.
291
We have not yet reached such a consensus on the need to protect collective
values that would justify blanket prohibitions of private consumptive or exclu-
sionary interests. For example, the statutes governing the public lands acknowl-
edge mineral, grazing, and other uses. The history of public land law fostered
use by individuals as well as maintenance of more diffuse public values. The
expectations that arose out of this regime must be considered. "Demoralization"
286 . Justice Rehnquist quibbles that because the owners could use the fallen trees, all value
was not destroyed. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But the investment-backed
expectation of the owners was not that cedars would be a source of firewood. See also Bowditch v.
City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 19 (1879) (no compensation if building destroyed to stop spread of fire);
William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L REV. 553, 563-65 (1972)
(destruction of building to stop the spread of fire is a remnant of King's prerogative power rather
than exception to compensation).
287 . Miller, 276 U.S. at 279.
288. See e.g., Sax, supra note 91, at 153-54 (many compensation denials involve inconsistency
between perfectly innocent and independently desirable uses).
289. Miller, 276 U.S. at 279-80. See also Dowling, supra note 191, at 380 (test useful in conflicts
arising out of nature).
290 . The Court employed a deferential standard: "we cannot say that ... exercise [of the po-
lice power], controlled by considerations of social policy which are not unreasonable, involves any
denial of due process." Therefore, mere rationality may have sufficed. Id. at 280. The Court did,
however, emphasize the economic value of apples. Id at 279. The decision's tenor justifies categoriz-
ing it among cases hinging on strong policy concerns.
291 . Cf Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence. An
Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L REV. 577, 589-91 (1990) (arguing local regulation goes through three
steps: anything goes, ad hoc takings review of land use regulations, and finally state legislative declara-
tions).
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costs are real costs, ones that impact on the ability to legitimize change.
292
Human expectations are part of the equation and need to be respected to afford
dignity to both judicial decisions and legislative mandates.
2 93
In an optimal world, the nation would clarify its priorities and, if the de-
sired result would suddenly change the status quo, we should agree to raise
enough taxes to implement the goals with compensation for all parties who find
their "private" rights affected. Naturally, solving all our environmental dilemmas
in this manner is an unlikely scenario. The bounds of existing law must be ex-
amined so that important collective goals may be achieved with the least disrup-
tion. In so doing, it must be acknowledged that some degree of wealth distribu-
tion is an inevitable result of all regulation.2 94 Nevertheless, some will have to
be compensated for bearing a disproportionate burden when "public" rights con-
front their "private" rights. With incremental changes in expectations through
education and new regulations, however, less and less compensation will be re-
quired.2 95  We will move from Duquesne, which limits returns from property
clothed with the public interest, to Miller v. Schoene, which creates the potential
for forwarding the public interest without any compensation whatsoever.
292 . If takings are too frequent and arbitrary, landowners will fail to make investments desir-
able for economic efficiency. See Michelman, supra note 90, at 1214-15 (defining demoralization
costs); Daniel W. Bromley, Regulatory Taking" Coherent Concept of Logical Concept or Logical Contradic-
tion?, 17 VT. L. REV. 647, 659 (1993); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actom A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L REV. 23, 35-40 (1989)
(criticizing law and economics models for failing to account for value of "psychologically vested
rights").
293 . See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-2900 (discussing the "historical compact" of the takings
clause); Fisher, supra note 143, at 1397-1402.
294 . See Justice Scalia's objection to the "off-budget financing" inherent in a rent control or-
dinance's requirement to consider a tenant's hardship in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22-23
(1988) (Scalia,)., concurring and dissenting) and the discussion in Minda, supra note 75, 616-18
(arguing such extra taxes" are inherent in land regulation because not only do they directly impact
those owning land, but also those seeking access to land).
295 . Cf Sax, supra note 73, at 1451 (arguing that during period transitional to an ecosystem
philosophy must mitigate burdens by phasing, grandfathering, andother techniques).

